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BSTRACT 
INTRODUCTION 
The major purpose of this paper is to analyze the 
effects of Sections 8 (b)(4)A and 10 (1) of the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947. 
Section 8 (b) (4)A of the Act terms as an unfair labor 
practice any attempt by a labor organization or its agents 
to induce or encourgge any secondary employer to cease doing 
business with any other person, (thus outle.wing the secondary 
boycott). Subsections B, C and D of 8 (b)(4) bars pressure 
to recognize a minority union, an uncertified union, and bars 
pressure to assign work to a pe.rticular trade or craft. The 
analysis of Section 8 (b)(4) was limited to subsection A, for 
violation of this subsection occurs more frequently than in 
B, C and D combined. One of the purposes of this thesis is 
to est ablish that subs ection A is designec1 to protect 11neutrals 11 
in industrial disputes, but in doing so, substantially weakens 
the power of organized labor. 
Section 10 (1) is related in that it provides for man-
dat ory injunctions for suspected violation of Section 8 (b)(4). 
One further object of this paper is to establish that this 
provision, in giving the employer temporary protection, pre-
determines the outcome of the dispute between the employer 
and the employee s . As a result, both Sections 8 (b)(4)A and 
10 (1) effectively weaken labor, thus reversing the trend of 
the immediate past. 
v 
This analysis is based primarily on cases that have 
come before the National Labor Relations Board and the 
Federal Courts. Therefore, the primary sources of informa-
tion utilized were the publications of the N. L. R. B. and 
the Bureau of National Affairs. Other important sources 
were Congressional hearings, records, and reports, law re-
views, union publications, professional journals, periodicals 
and several books on boycotts and injunctions. 
Chapter I contains a brief review of the attitudes 
of the government and courts towards the boycott and the l abor 
injunction from the Sherman Act up to the Taft-Hartley Act. 
The purpose of the chapter is to establish the fact that the 
so-called "pendulum of power" hR.S swung back and forth between 
labor and management, the Taft-Hartley Act being the lates t 
"equalizer. 11 Chapters II through VI contain analyses of 
Section 8 (b){4)A and Congressional intent, validation of the 
intent through analyses of cases arising under the Section, 
criticisms and proposed amendments of the Section, and, 
finally, concluding remarks on 8 (b)(4)A. Chapter VI through 
X contain analyses of Section 10 (1) and of the means by 
which it d.efeats unions. Chapter XI is composed of the 
findings and conclusions of the study. 
CHAPT.ER I 
HISTORY OF THE LABOR INJUNCTION AND THE S:ECONDARY BOYCOTT 
The use of the labor injunction by the Federal Govern-
ment and the employment of the secondary boycott by organized 
labor has been alternately accepted and rejected by the 
government and courts over the last sixty to seventy years. 
Because this paper is based, primarily, on the secondary 
boycott provision (Section 8 (b)(4)A ) and the mandatory 
injunction provision (Section 10 (1)) of the Taft-H~rtley Act , 
a brief historical review is desired to show the forces '''hich 
led to the enactment of these sections. Allegedly, the Clayton 
Act, the Nbrris-La GUardia Act, the Wagner Act, and the Taft-
Hartley Act were designed to restore the so-called "balance 
of power11 between labor and management. This chapter is con-
erned 1.11i th the attempts to restore the alleged 11 balance11 and 
hov7 these attempts finally resulted in the enactment of 
Sections 8 (b)(4)A and 10 (1) -. 
I . IN'ERODUCTION 
For over seven decades controversy has prevailed over 
the use of the secondary boycott by organized labor and the 
employment of the labor injunction by various governments 
( 1 cal and federal) , and ind.i vi duals-. · 
The first injunction issued to restrain strikers came 
2 
in the railvmy strike of 1877. 1 The following decade was 
marked by a great incre;:J.se in labor organizations, the Knights 
of Labor and others, and extensive and bitter .strikes. In-
junctions were issued in Maryland and Ohio in 1883 against 
glassworkers; in Iowa in 1884 against coal miners; in the 
1888 railway strike. Millis and Brown attribute the thorough 
. 
establishment of the labor injunction to two factors, the 
fir~t being the approval in 1888 of an injunction to restrain 
picketing by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, and 
the se9ond being the concurring., by the United States Supreme 
Court, with a lower court 1 s action in finding E. V. Debs in 
contempt of court for violation of a restrai?ing injunction 
in the Pullman Strike o:f 1.894. 
It was not until the 1930t~ that a decisive effort was 
made to limit the use of the injunction in labor disputes. It 
is of interest to note that twenty-eight injunctions were issued 
in the 1880 1 s, one hundred twenty-two in the 1890 1s, three 
hundred twenty-eight from 1900 to 1909, four hundred forty-six 
\ 
in the next decade and nine hundred twenty-one between January 
1, 1920 and May 1, 1930. In a space of fifty years, the use 
of the injunction in labor disputes increased 1,600 per cent. 
The theory behind the issuance of an injunction is 
that it should be used only in extraordinary cases where 
there is no specific rule of law covering the situation and 
1Harry A. Millie and Emily Clark Brown, From lli Wagner 
Act to Taft-Hartley (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, I90o}p. a. ·· · 
3 
where there is a threat of "irreparable" damage. The classic 
example is that of the tree, the roots of which are on one 
piece of property, but the branches of which extend over a 
fence onto another's property. Can the owner of the property, 
over which some of the branches extend, cut those branches 
off? With no law covering such a situation, the owner of the 
tree might apply for a restraining injunction, enjoining the 
other property owner from committing irreparable damage. 
Such an injunction remains in effect until the case is heard 
and decided. Violation is punishable as contempt of court. 
Labor disputes were brought within the scope of the 
injunction when the right to do business was recognized as 
a property right. '1/i th this being the case, any threat to 
an employer's business could be construed as a threat to his 
pvoperty and his right to do business. 
Judge Taft wrote the pioneer opinion basing federal 
injunctive relief in a labor dispute on violation of the 
Interst ate Commerce Act. He granted a decree restraining the 
chief executives of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 
from issuing any order requiring the employees of the rail-
ways over which they had control to refuse to handle and 
deliver freight cars from one state to another when hauled 
over the complainant's road, where a strike was in progress. 
Relying on the duty of a carrier under the Interstate Commerce 
Act to accept freight of a Connecting Carrier, Judge Taft held 
that the inducement of its breach not only involved a criminal 
4 
liability but also interference with interstate commerce. But, 
in any event, the injunctions in the railway strikes of the 
1890 1 s relied on the Sherman Act, holding the strikers to be 
in illegal restraint of interstate commerce. 
From then until the Wagner Act, the courts, in deciding 
whether particular union activities were illege~, weighed the 
injury to business or the restraint of trade. 
A majority of the injunction cases of the past occurred 
because of incipient or extensive and extended secondary boy-
cotts. One common type of secondary boycott occurred in 
situations where employer Brown would do the work of employer 
Jones, against whom a legitimate strike would be in progress 
over better working conditions, etc. The employees of Brown 
would be induced to go on strike against Brown to prevent 
Jones' work from being done; a secondary boycott would then 
ensue. 
Not all the objectives of secondary boycotts were as 
altruistic as the preceding. There were many to force sec-
ondary employers not to hire certain workers, not to u s e 
certain products, etc. 
From the 1890 1 s up to the present time, opinion on 
secondary boycotts and labor injunctions has uacillated. 
Through judicial interpretation, labor injunctions have been 
declared legal, then illegal, etc. The federal goverrunent 
has enacted anti-boycott and pro-injunction legislation, then 
5 
pro-boycott and anti-injunction legislation. The alleg ed 
balance of economic power has swung back and forth between 
employer and employees; the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was inter-
pret ed as applying to labor unions; the Clayton Act was to 
have reinstated a balance, but labor was still held not to 
be exempt under the anti-trust acts; then the balance of 
p01.-Jer swung decidedly in labor 1 s favor 1.'17i th the enactment of 
. the Norris LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act and the Wagner Act; 
and ; finally, the Taft-Hartley Act was passed to achieve a 
11 balance 11 once more. The following will be an account of 
the manner in which this occurred. 
II • THE SHERl>l:AN ACT 
"Passed primarily as a safeguard against the social 
and economic consequences of massed capital, 112 the Sherman 
Law provided broadly that "every contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
tra de or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. 11 This section wa s 
interpreted to apply against labor in the Debs, Buck Stove 
and Range, Danbury-Hatters cases, etc., thus hampering 
severely the boycott activities of organized labor. 
The secondary boycott that affected more people than 
any other in U. s. history wa s the one employed in the "Great 
2F'elix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene, The Labor In-
Junction (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930) p. 8.-
6 
Pullman Strike of 1894. 11 A dispute between the Pullman Company 
and its employees over certain company paternalistic measures 
erupted into a strike when in May, 1894, the company announced 
a twenty per cent reduction in wages. The American Railway 
Union, with whom the Pullman employees were associated, de-
cided, under Deb's leadership, to help the strike by forbidding 
its members to operate trains that included cars manufactured 
by the Pullman Company, a clear example of a secondary boycott. 
The paralysis of transportation spread to the west and south. 
\Hthin two days it became the national problem. President 
Cleveland ordeped the U. S. Marshal at Chicago to place special 
deputies upon all interstate trains. On July 2, the Attorney 
General of the United States directed the Uni~ed States 
Attorney in Chicago to apply to the District Court for an 
injunction restraining the union from interfering with the 
business of the railroads. The injunction was issued under 
the Sherman Act. 
Debs was charged with contempt for violating the in-
junction; the issuance of the injunction under the Sherman 
Act was upheld by the Supreme Court. From then on the labor 
injunction became one of the most effective weapons used by 
employers against strikes and boycotts. Two of the most 
famous cases in which injunctions were used to stop secondary 
boycotts during this period were the Buck Stove and Range and 
Danbury Hatters cases. 
? 
The Buck Stove and Range Company3 of St. Louis, Missouri, 
manufactured stoves and ranges. Mr. J. W. Van Cleave was its 
president. The Company was a member of the Stove Founders• 
Defense Association, which had collective bargaining agreements 
with the Iron Moulders International and the Metal Polishers 
Union. The existing agreements contained provisions for settle-
ment of disputes and maintenance of the status quo pending 
settlement. 
According to the claim of the Hetal Polishers in the 
Company's Nickel Department, the nine-hour day had been in 
force in that department since June, 1904, but on J anuary 1, 
1906, the company instituted a tan-hour day. The metal pol-
ishers wanted a return to the nine-hour day. They waited 
seven and a half months, and after no adjustment in the hours 
was forthcoming, three leaders of the Metal Polishers quit 
work at five p.m., after nine hours of work. The three workers 
were fired, and the ten-hour day was maintained. As a result 
the polishers went on strike. Mr. Van Cleave replaced them 
with nonunion workers. The local union retaliated with an 
appeal to the public not to patronize Buck Stove. 
Other unions in St. Louis as well as the American Fed-
eration of Labor came to the local's aid. Buck Stove and 
Range Company was put on the 11 \ve Don't Patronizei• list, pub-
lished in the American Federationist. 
3Reported in Elias Lieberman, Unions Before the Bar 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950) pp. 71-83. 
8 
At this time Hr. Van Cleave was also president of the 
National Association of Manufacturers. After the boycott had 
gone on for a year, the Company instituted an action in the 
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for an injunction. 
The suit was aided and supported by the American Anti-Boycott 
Association, and, we presume, the National Association of 
Manufacturers. 
The essential charges against the union were:4 
(1) Defendants conspired to injure the business of the 
90mpany by imposing a boycott. (2) The strike was to 
force the plaintiff against its will and business in-
terest to run the Nickel and Polishing Department only 
nine hours per day instead of ten hours per day. (3) 
Circulars were -distributed charging falsely that jthe 
employer increased the hours of labor from nine to ten 
and that J. W. Van Cleave was hostile to the labor move-
ment, and thus the defendants had interfered with the 
sale of Buck .Stoves. (4) The A. F. L. had conspired 
with the Metal Polishers to boycott Buck Stove, and the 
Federation put Buck 1 s name on its 11 We Don 1 t Patronize" 
list. (5) The Federation falsely stated that the Company 
had blacklisted its members and had refused to adjust 
any dispute with the foundry employee's union. 
The defendants stated in their answer: 
(a) They denied any conspiracy. (b) The employer imposed 
a ten-hour day, and the firm intended submitting the 
matter to the Grievance Committee for adjustment. 
(c) They denied that the circular contained false charges. 
(d) The Federation denied that it entered into any un-
lawful conspiracy. • • • ( e ) It had made attempts to 
settle the dispute, but in view of Van Cleave's hostile 
attitude toward labor organizations, it abandoned this 
effort as futile. 
As far as the court was concerned there were only two 
issues: had the plaintiff shown that there was a conspiracy 
to destroy his business, and, were the defendants connected 
4Ibid., p. 74. 
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with· the conspiracy? Justice Gould answered yes, and an in-
junction was issued. 
There was a delay of five days in issuing the injunction, 
so a copy of the Federationist was rushed through with Buck 
Stove on the 11\ie Don't Patronize" list once more. For doing 
so, the defendants were found guilty of contempt and sentenced. 
Samuel Gompers, president of the A. F. L., was sentenced to 
twelve months in prison. 
The .injunction was appealed to a higher court, but it 
was upheld on the basis that if a secondary boycott was made 
legal, it would be an "engine of harm and oppression • • • 
place the wealt. at the mercy of the strong," etc. The decision 
blunted the boycott as a means of bringing an employer to terms 
through economib pressure, but the coup de gras, so to speak, 
occurred in the Danbury-Hatters Case. 5 
Dietrich E. Loewe and Martin Fuchs owned a hatshop in 
Danbury, Connecticut. The United Hatters of Americ a , affili-
ated/ with the A~ F. L., attempted to organize the shop in 
March, 1901. In the communication bet"tveen the union and 
Loewe, it was pointed out to Loewe that en unfavorable deci-
sion on his part \~ould prompt the union to use its "usual 
methods 11 to bring about unionization. According to Lieberman, 
"this, apparently, meant a strike and an app eal to the public 
to boycott his hats." 
On April 22, 1901, Loewe replied in writing that he 
Brbid., pp. 56-?o. 
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refused to have his factory unionized. The workers at the 
shop went on strike July 25, 1902. A group of hat manufacturers 
had previously agreed to finance Loewe to the extent of $20,000. 
in his fight against the union. 
Loewe 1 s plant -wa.s declared 11unfair 11 , and an appeal \'le.s 
made to the public not to patronize its product. In January, 
1903, the plant reopened with inexperienced nonunion workers. 
A shipping clerk whose sympathies were with the union, though 
in the employ of the firm, reported to the union the destina-
tion of shipments of hats. Using this information, the union 
dispatched agents to Loewe{ s customers, urging them not -to 
handle Lowe hats. If the customers refused to, they were 
also considered 11 unfs ir. 11 
The leaders of the ~nerican Anti-Boycott Association 
persuaded Loewe to make a test case of this strike ancl the 
boycott against him. Their main object \'Jas to secure a court 
decision declaring such activities of unions illegal under the 
anti-trust laws. 
The attorneys for the union first sought to defeat the 
action through legal procedure based on technicalities. When 
their motion was denied, they contended that the union's ap-
peal to the public to boycott Loewe's hats could not be inter-
preted as a violation of the Sherman Anti~Trust Act; therefore, 
the case should be dismissed. Judge James Platt announced 
his decision on December 7, 1906. He held that the union actio.n 
11 
did not interfere with the means of transporting Loewe's product 
or with the product itself while being transported. The inter-
ference was with the manufacturing of the product, which, in 
itself, was not interstate commerce. Judge Platt dismissed 
the case. 
The Company app ea.l ed to the United States Circuit Court 
of Appeals for the Second District. Because the case involved 
a 11 novel issue of law, 11 the Court asked the United States 
Supreme Court for instructions. Both the plaintiffs and the 
defendants joined in requesting that the Supreme Court review 
the case. Thus the case was argued before the Supreme Court 
on December 4-5, 1907. 
The union was assailed as a 11 vast combination . • • and 
tha t in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, it maintained 
e. conspiracy to restrain interstate commerce. 116 
The defendants contended that: (1) the union did not 
interfere directly with transportation in interstate commerce, 
( 2) therefore, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was not e.pplic&.ble 
and {3) the activities of the defendants were lawful since 
the sole purpose of their activities was merely the improve-
ment of working conditions by means of organization. 
After many appeals .and decisions, the finaJ. decision 
was handed down on January 5, 1915. The final results were: 
{1) the circulation of an 11unfair list 11 was declared contrary 
to the Sherman Act if it restrained commerce, (2) all members 
6Ibid. I p. 60. 
12 
of the union could be held liable for damages and, (3) the 
existence of a seconda,ry boycott proved that the union was 
engaged in a combination and conspi:racy in restraint of trade. 
As a result of their experience in this case and in 
others, the leaders of the AmericDn Federation of Labor became 
convinced that the courts harbored a hostile attitude towaro . 
....... 
organized labor. To them, it was evident that a new ptece of 
legislation was needed--one which would protect the rights of 
unions to engage in their 11normal activities" and to limit 
the power of the courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes. 
III. CLAYTON ACT 
The special reliance for curbing what was de emed to 
have been exuberance in judicial interpretation of the Sherman 
Law was Section 6 of the Clayton Act. 
The labor of a hwnan being is not a commodity or 
article of commerce. Nothing contained in the anti-
trust laws should be construed to forbid the existence 
and operation of labor ••• organizations, instituted 
for the purpose of mutual help ••• or to forbid or 
restrain individual members of such organizations from 
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; 
nor shall such organizations or the members thereof, 
be held or construed to be illegal combinations or 
conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the anti-
trust laws. 
Frankfurter and Greene wrote that the most important 
problem was the lack of a uniform policy for the United States 
courts in labor disputes. They felt that the damage inflicted 
by labor through the strikes, the boycott and the picket, 
• 
• 
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"must win immunity by its purpose. 11 But that it was the 
11painful necessity" of the courts to decide whether the union 
has over-stepped its bounds. They felt that Secti0n 20 of the 
Clayton Act would set up objective criteria for the courts on 
which to base their decisions. 7 
••• no such restraining order or injunction shall pro-
hibit any person or persons, whether singly or in concert, 
from terminating any relation of employment . • • or from 
recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful 
means to do so; or from attending at any place where any 
such person or persons may lB.'toJfully be, for the purpose 
of peacefully persuading any person .•• to abst ain from 
working • • • • 
Labor's position was now improved, at least on the 
face of things. In the Clayton Act of 1914, labor believed 
that it had achieved its object of being free from att ack under 
the anti-trust laws. Samuel Gompers hailed the act as labor's 
"Magna Carta. "' But labor's joy was shortlived, for in the 
Duplex Case, the Supreme Court ruled that exemption of labor 
organizations applied only to the lawful "carry-out" of legit-
imate objects. This allowed management to bring secondary 
boycott cases before the courts to determine their legality. 
The Duplex CornpBny manufactured printing presses that 
were marketed in competition with the products of three other 
unionized companies. These three compani es complained of 
Duplex's lol-v er prices which were due to lower costs (lower 
wages, longer hours). The Machinist Union decided to call an 
organization strike against Duplex in Battle Cree~, Michigan. 
lvi embers in New York as well as wlsewhere refused to initial 
7Frankfurter and Greene, Q12.· cit., pp . 25-33. 
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or repair Duplex presses, warned a trucking firm not to haul 
them, and threatened a company with a strike if it exhibited 
them. 
The Court, in a divided decision (Justices Holmes and 
Cla rk dissenting), held t~~t under the Sherman Act and the 
Clayton Act this behavior could be halted., since the privilege 
of such action is limited only to those 11\lho are directly con-
cerned. The members of the union in New York were not directly 
concerned. The Court stat ed that proper int erpretation of 
Section 20 of the Clayton Act would be evidence enough tha t 
the mal~ ers of the act had only in mind particular industrial 
controversies. The dissenters opposed the decision on the 
ba sis that there is a wide common interest Mnong workers, and, 
therefore, the area of conflict should not be restricted to 
the region in which primary employer and primary employees 
are locatad. 
Labor was disappointed. Its 11Hagna Carta 11 had vanished 
and its position wa s no better than under the Sherman Act. To 
organized labor, it wa s clear that some federal la-t'll was nec-
essary which would curb the use of the labor injunc t ion and 
"broaden the terms or conditions of employment regardless of 
whether on not the disputants stood in the proximate relation 
of employer and employee. n8 
There were, in the 1920 1 s, a series of import ant deci-
sions affecting labor. The most significant were those in the 
8Lieberman, Q!2..· cit., p. 107. 
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Coronado Coal Cases. The union involved had attempted to stpp 
the production and shipments of nonunion coal, its rea son being 
that cheaper nonunion coal would tend to depress prices, and, 
in turn, the wages of union men. The Supreme Court held that 
this was a violation of the anti-trust acts; therefore, the 
local unions could be sued for treble damages. 
Labor organizations, before the significant changes in 
governmental policy in the thirties, were substantially re-
stricted in their activities. For the most part, labor law 
was declared by court decisions, especially in the injunction 
cases.9 The courts, instead of the Federal Gover~~ent, were 
ruling in the field of industrial relations. The use of the 
injunction was vehemently attacked by orgru1ized labor, just as 
it is today. Although the higher courts in many instru1ces 
modified labor injunctions, it proV.ided little comfort to those 
workers whose strikes or boycotts were broken by the injunction. 
Anti-injunction feeling was running high in the late 
20 1 s end early 30 1 s. Finally on March 23, 1932, the Norrie-
La Guardia Anti-Injunction Act was passed. 
IV. NORRI&-"LA GUARDIA ACT 
This ~ct drastically limited the power of the Federal 
Courts to issue injunctions, while it extended the definition 
of 11 right to strike, picket, or boycott. 11 Some were of the 
9 Hillis and Brown, on. cit., p. 13. 
·e 
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opinion that it was the first federal labor policy, to be 
uph~l~y the Supreme Court, giving workers full freedom from 
interference by employ.ers with their associations. The st ate-
ment of Federal policy is found in Section 2 of the Act. 
The public policy of the United States is hereby declared 
as follows: 
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, develop ed 
with aid of governmental authority for owners of property 
to organize in the corporate and other forms of ownership 
association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly 
helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to 
protect his freedo m of labor, and thereby to obtain ac-
ceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, 
though he should be free to decline to associate with his 
fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of 
association, self-organization, and designation of rep-
resentatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms 
and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be 
free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of 
employers of labor or their agents, in the designation 
of such representatives or in self-organization or in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; therefore, 
the following definition of, and limitations upon , the 
jurisdiction and authority of the Courts of the United 
States are hereby enacted. 
ive now find that such labor activities that are 11 con-
certed 11 or for 11mutual aid or protection" are lega,l and , · 
therefore, exempt from the use of the injunction, unless the 
employer can establish that 11 irreparable 11 damage would result 
(and if so, a temporary injunction could be effective for only 
five days.) It was rea soned that in the rulings on secondary 
boycotts preceding the act, most of the judges '\'llere not awar e . 
or did not consider the possibility or significance of the 
justification for the union's activities. Unity of interest 
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was not cori s idered. The p redomina nt considera tion was wh a t 
mi ght happ en to the firms supplying one firm with mat eria ls, 
or bu ying o r tran sporting its p roducts. The unio n 's vie"~;J­
poin t i·'ia s, if a t a.ll, ha rdly considered . 
Pa ssage of the Norris-La. Guardia Act purport edl y s1mng 
t h e bal a nce of p ower in l abor ' s f a vor. If ther e wa s any doubt 
a bo ut l abor ' s ne1,.J b a rgaining strength, such doubts ive r e 
quickly era sed with the ena.ctment of the National Labor Rel a tion s 
.·ct of 1935. 
V. THE il/AGNER ACT 
The bill wa s introduced. by Senator ''~agner in the Sena te 
o n February 21 , 1935, a nd a comp anion bill wa s intro duced in 
t h e House by Rep resentative Connery on February 28, 1935. 
Ext ensive he arings were held bef ore the Sen ate Committee o n 
7 ducat i on and Labor a nd before the House Committee on Labor 
a t v1hich representatives of ernp loyers, l abor and th e p ublic 
app ea red an d. st a t eel. their views. On Hay 2, 1935, the bill 
'TtJas reported by the Sen -te Committee with minor arnendments, 
and a fter deba t e , vJe.s pas s ed by the Sena te on Met.y 15, 1935. 
After a report by t he House Committ e e, recommitment, no. ex-
tensive d eba te on the House floor, it was p a ssed by both 
Houses of Congress on June 27 , 1935, and was s i gned by 
Presi dent Roosevelt on July 5, 1935. 
Joseph Rosenfa rb, 'l:vho wa s the a ttorney for the National 
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Labor Relations Board in the 1930's, stated that the findings 
and policies of the National Labor Relations Act are modeled 
after the Norris-La Guardia Anti-Injunction Act. 10 In other 
words, the National Labor Rels.tions Act is a further and more 
complete extension of the Norris-La Guardia Act, not only re-
affirming the legality of secondary boycotts but also defining 
employer unfair la.bor practices, etc. The section most im-
portant from the standpoint of this thesis is the policy 
declaration of Section 1, last paragraph. It reads as follows: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United 
States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial 
obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to miti-
gate and eliminate these obstructions "t.vhen they have 
occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of 
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by 
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, 
and designation of representatives of their own choosing, 
for the purpose of megotiating the terms and conditions of 
their employment or other mutual aid or protection. 
"Freedom from interference, restraint or coercion • • • 
in concerted activities 11 of the Norris-La Guardia Act and 
"protecting • • • the terms and conditions of their employ-
ment or other mutual aid or protection 11 of the \1/agner Act 
outlawed the injljnction in secondary boycott cases, and in 
doing so, made the secondary boycott legal. Employers could 
ask for an injunction only if the union were forcing him to 
commit an illegal act. 
10Joseph Rosenfarb, The National Labor Policy end How 
It Works (2nd edition; New York: Harper and Brothers, 194or-p:- 22. 
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'V'li th the pro-labor Wagner Act now part of the law of 
the land, unrest on the part of management due to the increased 
power of l abor, manifested itself in a continuous stream of 
criticism pointing up the inequities of the Act. 
Briefly, it was exgued that the act placed duties and 
obligations on employers but none on labor organizations. 
Employers pointed out that the Act prohibited interference 
by employers with the right of free choice by employees but 
did not specifically and effectively prevent such interference 
by unions, when, by boycott, strike or other show or threat of 
economic power, they attempted to coerce employers. The critics 
stated that some unions were so powerful that they would and 
sometimes did coerce employers, ~specially small employers, 
and their employees to violate the act. Millis and Brown 
write that 11 this was an especially serious problem in some 
areas, as California, and with some unions, a s the Team-
sters • • The greatest concern t<Jas with jurisdictional 
disputes a.nd a tt empts· by labor to do away with the democratic 
processes of organizing people by gainihg represent ation 
through boycotts, etc. This was the case for an"equalizing 
amendment." 
Typically, criticism of the boycott and strike pro-
visions of the Act followed the same pattern. For example, 
Lee H. Hill listed several types of "unjustifiable strikes--" 
llMillis and Brown, ~· cit., p. 247. 
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allowable under the \'lagner Act. Three of interest to us 
were the jurisdictional strike, the strike to force recogni-
tion, end the sympathetic strike. His conclusion was that 
the employer needed protection against labor and that "anti-
social, anti-employer and anti-employee acts on the part of 
unions should be listed as unfair labor practices on the part 
of unions. 1113 
The attacks on the Wagner Act grew, and with these 
attacks, demands arose for new labor legislation and curtail-
14 
ment of labor power. 
After World War II, the bigness of the union and the 
use of its vast power frightened many of the liberals in the 
government. Abuse of union power was made one. of the issues 
in the 1946 Congressional c~npaign by the Republicans. ~fuen 
a Republican Congress was elected, the Republicans believed 
that the election lva s a "mandate" to amencl the Wa.gner Act and 
to check the po,-Jer of labor. It was at this time, that many 
strikes were occurring in large industries. Anti-union feeling 
'liJas running high. 
Senator Taft, in tracing the development of the omnibus 
Years 
1 2Louis G. Silverberg, editor, The Wagner Act After Ten 
( W'ashington: The Bureau of National Affairs :-Y945) p. 108. 
l3Ibid·. , p ~ 107. 
14 ' 
"A conclusion that a union's economic power is excessive 
must rest, by and large, upon a prior conclusion that the ends 
attainable through use of the power are not legitimate. 11 George 
rJ . Taylor 1 "National Labor Policy I II The Annals of the American 
Academy of Politice~ ~nd Social Science, p . 190., March, 1951. 
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Labor l,fanag ement Relations Act, stated that the employer 
15 
originally had the advantage in a labor dispute. The em-
ployer could refuse to recognize the union, stand a str ike 
bett er, a nd easily get en i njunction issued. This "unfai r 
situation 11 was the reason for p assage of the Clayton , Norri s-
La Guardia and Wagner Acts. But these laws more than rein-
st a.t ed the bal ance, so the.t by 1946, all those employer s ex-
cept the very largest were under a severe handicap . 
The Taft-Hartley Law was an atta~pt to resto re some 
equality between employer and employee so t hat there 
might be free collective bargaining. There can be no 
such bargaining if one p arty feels that the goverruaent 
and the courts will b3.ck up whatever unreasonable de-
mand he may mak e. But it wa s equally important not to 
swing the p endulum back s~6far as to give the employer age.in an undue advantage. 
One of the a i ms of Congressmen Taft and Hartley was to 
outlaw the secondary boycott. Hartley, House sponsor of the 
bill, numbering his rea sons f or a new labor law, included a 
f l a t prohibition against the use of a secondary boycott by a 
union. He felt that "the secondary boycott repre f?ented one 
of the many extra legal methods t ha t labor r acketeer s had 
develop ed under the Wagner Act. 1117 And Senator Taft suggested 
th e use of a mandatory in j unction when a violation of the sec-
15Fred A. Hartley, Jr., Our New National Labor Policy 
(New York: Funk and \'Va gnalls in a ssociation with Modern 
;J:ndustry Magazine , 1948), Preface p. xii. 
16Loc. Cit. 
17Ibid., p. 42. 
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ondary boycott provisions of the law was evident. 
On June 23, 1947, the Labor Management Relation Act 
was passed. Among its many provisions was a proscription of 
secondary boycotts, provision for mandatory injunctions, and 
a list of employee unfair labor practices. 
In reviewing the decisions and legislation of the past 
sixty-five years, it is evident there have been a variety of 
policies concerning seconde~y boycotts and the injunction. 
Changing attitudes on the part of the Federal Government and 
the Courts resulted in legislation and decisions favoring one 
group and then the other. The Taft-Hartley Act, according to 
Senator Taft, 11 was an attempt to restore some equality between 
employer and employee." In the past, restoration of equality 
was partially attempted by outlawing or legalizing secondary 
boycotts and by providing for or doing away with the labor 
injunction. And just as in the past, part of the "equalizing" 
Taft-Hartley Act contained sections relating to the boycott 
and the injunction. Our attention will now turn to a con-
sideration of the secondary boycott and mandatory injunction 
sections of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. 
CHAPTER II 
SECTION 8 (b){4)A M~D OBJECTIVE 
With the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, secondary 
boycotts were outlal-Jed. This signified a sub.stantial · reversal 
of governmental attitude toward labor's economic power. It 
is our intent in this section to analyze Section 8 (b)(4)A 
to determine, (1) if its purported objective was realized, 
(2) what qualifications, if any, must be made, (3) what 
conclusions can be made as to its effectiveness~ (4) how it 
effected labor's power, and (5) what the proposals for change 
ar e . 
I. SECTION 8 (b)(4) 
Secondary boycotts were made illegal under Section 8 
(b) ( 4) of the Labor l•Ianagement Relations Act of 1947.1 Sec-
tion 8 (b)(4) has four objectives: (A) The first prohibited 
action is the forcing or requiring of an employer or self-
employed person to join any organization, or more important, 
forcing or requiring anyone to cease using the products of, 
or doing business with, any other person, thus banning 11 sec-
ondary boycotts. 11 (B) The second prohibits a labor organiza-
tion from forcing recognition by any other employer of any 
union unless certified, thus preventing pressure in behalf 
of what may be a minority union. The related (C) bans pressure 
1see complete statement of Section in Appendix A. 
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against any employer to recognize a particular union wh~n an-
other has been certified as the representative of the em-
ployees in a unit. (D) The fourth attempts to protect em-
ployers and workers against jurisdictional di_sputes by pro-
hibiting a strike or a boycott for the purpose of forcing an 
employer to assign work to the members of a particular labor 
organization or a particular trade or craft. 
We will confine our discussion to ' Section A in which 
there is reference to secondary boycotts as such, although all 
four parts are interrelated in that they all involve matters 
of secondary action. 
The following table, presenting the total number of 
c ases reaching the National Labor Relations Board through the 
fiscal years 1948 to 1955, along with the nrunber of cases 
arising under Section 8 (b)(4), will enable the reader to 
judge the relative importance of these cases: 2 
Total 
Cases Breakdown of 8 (b)(4) Cases Showing 
Total Under Specific Allegations. 
· Year L.M.R.A. 8 (b)(4) A if B ! C 1 D 
1948 10636 311 224 72.0 74 23.8 20 6.4 71 
1949 25874 340 247 72.6 89 26.2 30 8.8 77 
1950 21632 341 161 47.2 14 4.1 21 6.2 66 
1951 22298 239 143 59.8 60 25.1 22 9.2 72 
1952 15901 302 189 62.6 64 21.2 26 8.6 89 
1953 14712 250 160 64.0 47 18.8 15 6.0 71 
1954 14041 335 234 69.9 70 20.9 21 6.3 85 
1955 13336 427 303 71.0 124 29.0 39 9.1 82 
2National Labor Rel ations Board, Annual Reports of the 
National Labor Relations Board--Thirteenth to Twentieth-rl948-
1949) (Washington: Government Printing Office), also, See 
2f 
22.8 
22.6 
19.3 
30.1 
29.5 
28.4 
25.4 
19.2 
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The number of 8 (b)(4) cases have been increasing over 
the last several years. In the last five years there has been 
an increase in 8 (b)(4) cases, but there has been a decrease in 
tot a l cases. In order to draw any conclusions as to trends , 
etc •• it "t<Jould be necess ary to have figures covering a. greater 
length of time. An examination of the industrial distribution 
of ca ses reveals that more than half of the secondary boycott 
cases occur in the manufacturing and construction industries. 3 
II. OBJECTIVE 
Although there were no positive statements made by 
Senator Taft, Congressman Hartley, or other supporters of the 
bill concerning the intent of Section 8 (b)(4)A other than 
that of outle,\ving seconda.ry boycotts, certain inferences can 
be made. Section 8 (b)(4)A was not written into the act to 
outlaw secondary boycotts, per se. Senator Iviurray of Montana 
and other Congressmen were concerned with the protection of 
the seconde.ry employer--the 11 innoc ent party. u4 Their int erest 
did not rest in protecting the primary employer in a l abor 
statistical pages of Appendix B. (In 1948 Bnd 1949, the. NLRB 
included all secondary boycott disputes in its statistics. 
From 1950 through 1955, only those cases which the NLHB had 
to render a deci sion in are included.) The breakdown figure for 
~ (b) (4) for each _year will not equal the yearly totals, for many 
cases_involve violation of one or more of the subsections of 8 (b)(4) 
3Loc. Cit. 
4 Congressional Record, Volume 93, Part 4. 80th Congress. 
M~::ty 9, 194?, Senate, pp. 4844 f. 
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dispute. In their opinion the labor union has a right to put 
economic pressure on the primary employer. Their concern was 
with the innocent secondary employer who is dra1-m into the 
dispute by mea.ns of a secondary boycott. It is for this reason 
that Congress wished to outlaw secondary boycotts--to protect 
11 neutrals 11 in industrial disputes. This interpretation is sup-
ported by many others. Thomas E. Shroyer, who \'las regional 
attorney for the National Labor Relations Board for six years, 
\'Jhen testifyine; before the U. S. Senate Committee on Ta_ft-
Hartley Revisions, st ated, concerning. Section 8 (b) (4), that--
••• it was the purpose of these provisions to provide 
relief for that innocent secondary employer caught in a 
dispute bet\-Jeen a primary employer and the primary em-
p i oyer1s union. Congress wished to protect that sec-
ondary employer who h ad no quarrel with his employees 5 but was made a victim of someone else's quarrel •..• 
Congress was not concerned with protecting primary 
employers, but rather with protecting 11 disinterested emp loyers 
against direct pressures by an union. 11 6 
"Section 8 (b) (4)A, 11 stated Sumner Slichter, 11 is de-
signed in the main to protect 11 neutrals 11 in industrial dis-
7 putes. 11 
5United States Congress, Senate Committee, Taft-Hartley 
Act Revisions, Part I March 24-Harch 31, 1953 ( l'la shington: 
Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 33. 
6Natione.l Labor Relations Board, Twentieth Annual Report: 
1955 (Wa shington: Goverrunent Printing Office, 1955), p. 110. 
7 sumner slichter, "The Taft-Hartley Act, II ~ Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, (May , 1953), p. 164. 
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It is our contention tha t Section 8(b)(4) A of the 
Labor 11anagement Relations Act of 1947, d.oes, in effect, pro-
tect "neutral s 11 in industrial disputes when that protection 
does not interfere with a union 1 s "lawful primary rights. 11 
But in affording this protection, the Section prevents the union 
from extending the conflict, thereby weakening organized labor. 
A union's "lawful primary rights, 11 e.s used in this pap er , 
mean the right to strike and the right to picket the primary 
employer. 
An analysis will be made of several of the case s tha t 
have come before the National Labor Rela tions Board and the 
Courts of App eals. Criticisms e~d proposed amendments will 
also be examined. 
The analysis will be presented by classifying the 
types of disputes arising under the section. They are: 
( a ) Constitutionality of Section 8 {b) (4) A, (b) 11 Simple 11 
Secondary Boycott, (c) Primary Action with Secondary Effects, 
{d) Allies, (e) Situs of Dispute, and (f) Unfair Ca ses. 
By 11 simple 11 secondary boycott disputes, v-1e r efer to 
those ca ses in which ther e is no question as to, (1) the 
exist ence of a secondary boycott, (2) 't>Jho the 11 neutral 11 is, 
and (3) who the primary employer is. These disputes are 
presented first so tha t the reader may have in mind a clear 
and 11 simpl e 11 picture of a typical outlawed. boycott. 
The remainder of the cases deal with 11precedent-making 11 
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decisions. These are the cases in which the National Labor 
Relations Board and the courts found it necessary to define, 
interpret, and qualify . parts of Section 8 (b)(4) A. It is nec-
essary, in this analysis, to review these cases, for these 
types comprise the majority of cases that reach the National 
Labor Rel ations Board and all of the cases that the courts 
review. It is through the decisions in the following cases 
that we will be e.ble to determine the extent to which 11neutrals 11 
are protected and_ the extent to which labor is weakened. 
CHAPTER III 
CASES UNDER 8 (b)(4)A 
An attempt shall be made in the following cases to 
det ermine (1) what type of boycott is outlawed, (2) who 
11 neutrals 11 are, (3) '\ol}hether or not the 11 neutrals 11 were 
afforded the protection of Section 8 {b) (4) as intended by 
Congress, and (4) the extent to which labor is weakened. 
I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 8 (b)(4) A 
One of labor's first objectives af\"ter the passing of 
the Labor Management Rela tions Act of 1947, was to test its 
constitutionality. Labor believed that the boycott section 
was an abridg6nent of the guarantee of freedom of spe ech and 
the protection against involuntary servitude. This opinion 
wa s baseo. on the fact tha t one of labor's boycott weapons 
was the "unfair list. 11 If a s econdary employer used the pro-
d.uct s of a primary emp loyer or di cl business ,.Ji th a primary 
employer '\ol}hile he was involved in a labor dispute, the 
striking union would be inclined in many inst ances, to cl a ss 
the secondary employer as 11unfair. 11 They then would circula te 
an "unfair list 11 in an attempt to get others to boycott the 
secono.ary employer. The unions believed that this procedure 
wa s legal because of the constitutional guarantee of free 
speech. 
Assertions tha t the secondary boycott provision of 
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Section a (b)(4)A were in conflict wi th the constitutional 
guarantee of free speech a nd protect i on against involunt ary 
servitude were rejected by the Supreme Court in the Schenley 
Casel and in the ·w·at son Speci a lty Store Case . 2 
In the both cases , the court observed that , insofar a s 
first C?..mendment rights v.•ere concerned , Congress in imposing 
the limit C?. tion of Section 8 (b)(4) A had e xercised the rec-
ognized power "to set the l i mits of permissible contest open 
to industrial combC?.tants . n3 The Nat ional Labor Re l ations 
Board stated : 
In both t he Schenl ey and \"Jatson Specio.lty Case s , the 
court held the:: t t he orohibi tion of secondary bovcotts 
did not r e stllt in co~stitutionally proscribed involuntary 
servitude s ince the restriction imposed affected only the 
conduct of unions and their agents but did not restrain 
employees from exercising
4
their constitutional right to 
abandon work at any tin1e . 
The validation of t he constitutionality of the section 
meant thet t he s e conde:;.ry em ployer (the neutral ) vms protecte d 
from the use of secondary a ction on the part of l abor unions . 
II . trSilVIPLEtr SECONDiulY BOYCOTTS 
This section conta ins t wo case s, both of which present 
cl ear pictures of illegal boycotts . 
1N1RB v. ~iline ~Jorker s Union , Loc al 1 (Schenley ) 1949. 
2NLRB v . Brotherhood of Carpenters , Loca l l n Jatson) 19Lr9 . 
3Nationa l L~bor Re l ati ons Board , Fifteenth Annua l . Report : 
1950 (\1£as hington : Govormnent Print ing Office , 1950) , p. 176, 
citing Supreme Court De ci sion. 
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The first concer ns a mus ician's uni on vv-hich had a dis -
pute with a r ad io sta tion that bro adcast s from a base ball park 
and an ar ena .,5 The un i on pi cke ted t he r adio station a s vJe ll 
as the ba l l park and the arena~ · The picketing at the ball 
park cove red all the entra nces , i nc luding t hose f or empl oyees , 
but usu ally after the empl oyee s of the ball park had entered 
the station .. The pi cketing of the ar e na , hov.•e ver, beg · n before 
t he arena employees entered the bui l ding . The sir,·ns carried bv 
. J 
the pi cke t s di d no t have any encourageme nt on them to the e f fe ct 
t. h C:>,t "chs se condc.:ry empl oyees strike . But , the union asked the 
secondary employers e ithe r t.o put pres s ure on the primary em-
ployer t o set tle the dispute or to ce<:tse do ing bus i ness wit.h 
hi rn. 
In t hi s situntion , the mus icians are the primary em-
pl oyees c:.nd the r e:;d i o s t a t i on i s the prirne:,ry emp l oyer . The 
uni on ni cketed tho r c::.dio Et a.ti on 'l;Jhi ch i s ollo'V'rab l e , but a.s 
s oon c:u:: the union ext ende d the e.re a of conflict by picb: t i ng 
the baseba ll park and t he a rena , which are the ''cus tomers" 
of the r adio stat i on , a secondar y boycott ensued . The obj e ct 
of picl(eti ng t he b c.;.l l park a nd the D.renD i'ic?: S to put pres~rm~e on 
the secondary p~rties to cease doing bus i ness with the r adio 
stat i on. Such act ion i s s pecifi ca lly enjoined under Section 
8 (b) (L1.) A. 
The U. S. Court of ADoeals fo r the Second Ci rcuit en-
5NLRB v . ' sEw ci o.ted i•iius icia.ns of Gre e>.t er N. Y., Loc a l 
802 •. 
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forced the Ne.tional Labor Relations Board order against the 
boycott. The court found evidence sufficient enough to 
prove that the union wa s attempting to encourage the em-
ployees of the secondary employer to strike in order to force 
their employers to cease doing business Nith the r a dio st a tion. 
The fact that the picketing did not cause a strike by the seo-
ondary employees 1:vas considered irrelevant. The Act 1 s ban on 
secondary boycotts includes attempts to ,; 11 induce or enooure.ge 11 
such a boycott. Hence, the union 1 s picketing could_ be for-
bidden despite the fact tha t it did not achieve the intended 
result. The picketing anc1 other forms of coercion were 
stopped, thereby protecting the se condary employers. 
A Teamster's union picketed three department stores 
that were doing hlsiness with an emp loyer ir,Jith whom they h ad 
a di spute. 6 vle note that the primary emp loyees h ave enl ar g ed 
the dispute to include secondary employers. The National 
La.bor Relations Bo C~.rd held tha t :the union h a d viola ted Sec-
tion 8 (b) ( 4 )A by picketing the premises of the stores in 
ord.er to force the stores to cease doing business 1-v i th a. 
delivery comp any. A cease and desist order was issued so a s 
to s a fe guard. the clepartment stores 1 11 neutrali ty. 11 
The preced-ing cases are c1e s.r examples of seconda ry 
boycotts. In. both the "neutral" 'ti'J a s p rot ected and the labor 
6Internationa1 Brotherhood of Teamsters (85 NLRB No. 
181 August 31, 19 49) reported in Month~ Labor Revi et-J , 
November 1949, p. 556. 
• 
• 
union involved wa s prevented from using the boycott. But 
there are situations in which there is uncertainty a s to 
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whether the action is prime.x·y or secondary, whether the 
p rimary emp loyer is 11 a lliecl 11 \vith the secondary employer , 
,:-Jhether the action occurs at a primary site, etc. ~le she.ll 
now turn our att ention to these ca ses. 
III. PRIMARY ACTION WITH SECONDARY EFF~CT S 
In some instances, lawful p rimary action on the part 
of unio n s h a s had secondary effects. This co nflicts t<J ith 
t he legislative inten t of Congress, for Congress is unabl e to 
a f f ord the p rot ection of 8 (b) (4) to seconda ry employers in 
such situa tions. 
The Natione~ Labor Relations Board had st a t ed tha t it 
was clea r from legisla tive history of the act the_t Section 
8 (b ) ( 4 ) .A. l.<Jas a i med a t seconda ry end not primary action . 7 
The Board had endea VOl"'ed, ther efore , to balance in such cas es 
the following intentions of Congress: 
(1) The i n tent to outlm•J secondary strikes and boycotts 
of the character describ ed a nd ( 2) the intent to pr.e-
serve tha l awful "primary means 1vhich unions tra di-
tionally use to press their d emands on employers. uS 
In c a ses decided under this section during the fisc al 
yea r 1950, the Bo a rd had been engaged chiefly in delineating 
7Pure Oil Co., 84 NLRB , 1949. 
8op . Cit., 15th .~nual Report, p . 137. 
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case by case, the bounds of this area of lavJful p riwary action. 
In drm.ving the line, the Board at tempted to dis'cinguish b etween 
illegal seconcla :r"J a ctivities a nd l eJ-Jful p rimary a ction with 
secondary effects. The Supreme Court indicated in- the Inter-
national Rice Hilling Cas e9 that a union c1oes not violat e the 
section if it inflicts on a secondgry emp loyer h ar m \vhich is 
mer ely incident a l to traditionally lawful p rimary strikes. 
The first test occurred in the Pure Oil Ca se in 1949 . 
The Board ruled that: 
... the f act that the union's primary pressure on 
(the primary employer 1 s) premises does not in our 
op inion, convert lawful primary action i nto (-un) law-
ful secondary action within the meaning of Section 8 
(b)(4) A. To hold otherwise might well outlaw virtually 
every effective strike, for a consequence of all strik es 
is some interferenc e 't-Jith busin!0s relationships between the struck emp loyer and others. 
The fact that the union 1 s 11 la't-Jful primary a ction 11 a lso 
had a secondary effect did not make its action secondary. 
PureOil and Stano.ax•d Oil used the same dock. Standard Oil 
workers went on strik e. Pure Oil workers refuseo. to cross 
the picket line. A ship 's crew of the National Maritime Union 
was ao.vised by the striking union that the dock 1-Ja.s 11 hot. 11 
The dock cont a ined Pure Oil c argoes, but bec ause the c1o ck was 
l abeled 11 hot, 11 th e crew refused to pick up the cargo. 
The Pure Oil Case clearly illustra tes a situa tion in 
9NLRB v. Int 1 1 Ri c e Hilling 341 US 665, 671, 1949. 
1015th Annual Report, Lo c. Cit. 
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which a neutra l in an industri al dispute cannot be protected. 
If the National Labor Rela tions Bo a rd. h ad decided in f a vor of 
the Pure Oil Company, then the Standard Oil work ers 'l.vould have 
been prev ented from c a rrying on 11lawful p rimary a ction. 11 Pic-
keting the site of a dispute is "lawful primary action. 11 
The National Labor Relations Bo ard decision in the Ry a n 
Constructioh Case st a ted that union action would be conside red 
p rimary if the union did not attempt to enlarge the 
ground" beyond the premises of the primary employer. 
The Board stated tha t: 
If battle-
Section 8 (b) (4)A was intended only to outlaw certain 
secondary boycotts wh ereby unions sought to enL .r g e the 
economic b attleground beyond the premise s of the primary 
employ er . \Vhen picketing is wholly at the premises of 
the employer with whom the union is eng~.g ed in a l abor 
dispute, it cannot be called "secondary 1 ev en though, as 
is virtually alivays the case, an object of the picketing 
is to dissuade all per:rons from ent ering such premis .~s 
for business rea sons. 
It is evident, then, that another employ er, using 
property in common with R primary emp loyer, c a nno t be pro-
t ected by Section 8 (b).(4) A if 2 .. n industrial dispute occur s 
between the p rimary emp loyer ano. the primary employees . 
IV. ALLIES 
In some c a ses, determination a s to whether or not the 
boycot~provisions of t h e Taf t-Hartley Act hav e been violated 
hinges on the status of the secondary employer with whom the 
primary employer was a llegedly 11 doing business 11 within the 
meaning of the act. If the Bo a.rd decides that the secondary 
employer is 11 allied 11 with the primary employer, then he is 
!!Fifteenth Annual Report, Op. Cit., p . 138. 
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no longer considered a nneutraln a nd cannot be afforded the 
protection of Section 8 (b)(4). 
12 The New York Shipping As s oci t,tion Case v-ras unique in 
that the striking union claimed it had the right to exert 
pressure o.gain ~:t se condary employers because they proved 
themselves "allies in intere st with struck employers" by 
substituting another service for the primary employer's ser-
vice. The National Labor lle l utions Board upheld the trial 
exa.miner 's conclusions thCJ t "the unionts pressure agc'tinst 
association members in conne ction v'i th its strike aga inst 
tugboa t operators did not l ose its secondary character be-
cause association member s resorted to me ans other th.:m t ug- -
boa.t service to mainta in their vmterfront operations. nl3 In 
the trial examiner's opinion, the pier employers by seeking 
to accaumodate t heir operat i ons to the strike si tuDtion did 
not make t hemse lves 11 a l l ies in i nter est. with struck employers. 1t 
'l'he trial examiner cone luded that: 
A seco ndcry employer f a ced with a stri ke against his 
supplier of services i s not obliged to s it idly by 
les t he f orfe it his status as a neutral; he may , with-
out risking the protection Section 8 (bJ(4)A accords 
him agains t the eJd ens ion to his business of e conomic 
conflicts in "t-Thich he is not involved, seek othe r sup-· 
pliers, devise other methods , and employ other means 
to enable him to co ntinue 1hi s business on as nearly normal level as pos s ible. 4 
12united Harine Division, Local 333, ILA (N. Y. Shipping 
As s oc.) 107 NLRB No. 152, 1953. 
13National Labor Re l a tions Boa rd, Nineteenth Annua l Report: 
1954 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 106. 
14Loc. Cit. 
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In another case, the irsecondary employer" whose em-· 
ployees the union had induced to engage in a strike, was a 
river transportation company which transported lumbEr for the 
primary employer •. 15 The Boc..u-d held that no secondary boycott 
was involved, because the transport company was not a "neutral" 
or "wholly unconcerned u party vri thin the me e.ning of Section 8 
(b)(4) A but rather an nally" of t he lumber company. This 
conclus ion wa f: based on the f a ct that the stock 01,:nershio and 
. ~ 
managerial contra ct of the t v.!o compa nies were vested in the 
same individua ls and tha t the t vlO companies were engaged in 
a "straight line oper.:Jtion" in which the transport company 
vms utilized by the lumber company "as a necessary ad junct 
to t he production of lumber." 
In the Climax Machinery Case, however, t he issue before 
the Boa rd Wets whether or not a product boycott was a proper 
exercise of the employees ri ght to withhold services--the con-
tention being tha-t primary and secondary employers 1.vere related 
as contract or and s ubcontractor. 16 The Board rejected the 
union's contention tha t a s ubcontra. ctor cl.Utomatically becomes 
an "allyn of the contractor and loses his status as a "neutral 
party . " The Board rea s oned tha t the pri mary employer had no 
control over the opere.tions of employees of the secondary em-
ployer . The Board also pointed to a previous decision in v.rhich 
15 Irwin-Lyons Lumber Go. , (87 r~RB 54) 
16
climax Jviachine ry Company ( 86 NLRB 1243) 1953 
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it extended the protection of Section 8 (b ) (4)A to subcon-
tractors in the building industry .. 
This philo~ophy was also applied in a case reported in 
the I'vlonthly La bor Review of J:l.1ay 1 1950.. In this casE;J, a con-
tractor who agreed to build a house, let out the carpentry to 
a subcontractor employing union men, and let out the electrical 
work to a nonunion employer.. An elE:ctrical union , hE·aring of 
this situa tion,. sent a n agent to picket the project . The agent 
also a ttempted to persuade the c c: rpenters to quit vmrk. The 
contractor was told the. t he could not finish his job unless 
he replaced the nonunion electrical subcontra ctor with one 
employing union members. Charges l·vere brought a gainst the 
union for causing the subcontractor employing nonunion men 
to quit the job., 
The court held tha t the union agent, 1::y persuading the 
c a rpenters to quit, had induced them to aid in forcing the 
main contra.ctor to cease doing business with the electrical 
contractor.. 1'he union countered by ste.ting tha t since the 
builders and t he electrical contractor ·were engaged in the 
same vent ure, t .hey ·were Ha llie sn a nd the secornar·y boycott 
provisions could not a.pply.. The court rejected this contention. 
It stated that: 
• • • coercion upon a t hird pe r 2on to break a contra~ 
left such a pers on in a more embarassing position than 
vJhen he could discontinue rel e.tions without danger of 
incurring liability . • • • The purpose of the picketing 
v.Jas obviously not prima ry., '}'he aim was to prevent the 
builders from doing business with the electricians, 
r ather th<m to cause the lat ter 's employers to strike •17 
A warehouse union stri king for the right to barge.i.n 
with an employer , noted that an unusually large m.unber of 
shipments consigned to the primary employer were being de-
livered to a lot next to the secondary employer's warehouse . 
There its cargo was transferred to the primary employer's 
truck and. transferred to him. 1'he strikers picketed the sec-
ondary employer'·s warehouse and urged drivers not to deliver 
the warehouse goods consigned to the primary employer. This 
is a si tuC'_tion in which t he secondary employEr , although not 
"allied n with the primary employer, was, in fact , aiding the 
primary employer. The National Labor Relations Board ruled 
that a union which relied on the "a lly" defense had to prove 
tha t specia l circumst ances existed to justify its conduct. 18 
The Board stated that there was no evidence to prove that the 
increa se in shipment s consigned to the primary employer but 
delivered to the secondary employer was due to the strike or 
that the struck employer had contra cted for the storage space 
involved. Therefore , the union a ction wa s in violation of 
Section 8 (b)(4)A. 
From t he informe.tion pre sented above, v-.re may conclude 
that the only instance in which a union can be absolved in 
17 . Th~s interpret c=,tion of the court has been subject to 
much criticism~ See discus s ion on Building Trades in Chapte r 
IV .. 
1~arsh Foodliner s , Inc., 114 NI,RB No. 108 (10/24/55) 
disputes involving secondary action is in situations in which 
it can be proved the.t t he t wo companies are unde r the ovmer-
ship or direct orship of one individual. If the secondary 
employer's busine s s is not a ne ce s sary adjunct of the primary 
employer ' s business, then he is termed a "neutral r and is 
protected by the l aw, and to this extent l abor is weakened. 
V. SI TUS OF DISPUTE 
By f ar, the gre atest problem incurred in adjudication 
under the Section , occurs in "Situs of Dispute" c~ es. In 
these cases , the empl oyer ' s nnormal" busine ss is usually 
carried on ~t different locations, which r a is e s t~ question 
a s to v.rhethe r or not t he dispute is at a pri a.ry situs . If 
t he Board decides tha t union action is not being carried on 
at a primar y site , t he union is subject to t he boycott pro-
vis i ons of the llVIRA . It is a question of "ba l ancing rights . n 
Picket ing at B.ny s i te other t han the primc:1.ry site is considered 
to be s e condary a ction. Picketing at a primary site is a llowed 
eve n if the picketing has se condary eff e cts . 19 T~ Board 
stated: 
In this situation the Board recognizes that the tradi-
tional right of a union to picket at the location of a 
l9The primary s itus theory has been extended by the 
Boa.rd to per mit the inducement of t he employers of a secondc.l r y 
employer , even a t the pr emises of a s e condary employer , so 
long as the a ctivity 1-vhich is t he object ive of the inducement 
is to t ake pl a ce at the pr emise s of the primazy employer. 
See Service Trade Chauffeurs Case below. 
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l abor dispute and the competing right of a neutral em-
ployer to be free from picket ing in a controve r sy in 
whi ch it is not dire ct ly involved cannot be absolute. 
The problem is one of balEmc i ng rights. Vfue n the 
pi ck~ting union by it s picketing signs or by its con-
~uct on the picket line or el sewhere indicates t hat 
the di spute extends beyond the pri ma.ry employers, the 
picket i~g union violate s the s econdary boycott pro-
visions of the a ct. On ·. the other hand, if the picketing 
by its s i gn a nd conduct does indicate that its disagree-
ment is only v-;ith the pri mary employer, its conduct is 
primary a nd l av1ful even though employees of neutral em-
ployers may of t he ir own volition r efuse to cross the 
picket line and theTeby exert pressure on t he primar y 
employer . These secondary effe cts of legitimate primary 
picketing mus t be regarde d as incident a l in t he light of 
the l egi s l ative history of t he Taft-Hart ley Act.20 
Be aring this statement i n mind, l e t us e xa.mine some of 
the ma j or d i sputes to come befo re t:. he Bo ard. 
By a three to tHO decision, the Nat icnal Labor Helctions 
Boe.rd upheld a deci sion of a t rial e .xc:mliner that a l abor or-
ganization is not subj ect to the secondary boycott provi s ion 
by maint aining pi ckets at the e ntr~nce to a secondary employer's 
shipyaTd in which a ship owned by the pr i mary empl oyer is in 
d k G • 21 _ dry oc _ ~or convers1on purposes . ~n t hi s s ituat ion a n 
Arneric .s n ve ssel wc.;s 1·vithdr uvm from shipnine and a. Pan c:;mEmi an 
vessel was substit ute d . I n order to r eady the vessel for t.he 
conveyanco of gypsum , t he owner s entered into a contra ct \vith 
the do ckyard company for the purpos e of converting the ship 
for the cm~rying of that material . The agreement provided 
20runeteenth Annual He port , .QQ. Ci t ., p . 107. 
21,, · 1 ' -- . "' t 1· 1·· . ~ . (TI D D 1 ,.., ) 0a1_or s Unlon OI ae ~a cli l c Yoore ry oc~ Go •• 
92NLRB 5L:-7 , 1950 . 
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that during the las t two vveeks before the completion of the 
1:-rork, the ov ..rner would be permitted to pl a ce a crevv on board 
for tra ining purposes . 
A sailor's union, suppor ted by a maj or ity of t he crew, 
advert i sed i ts dispute with the 01-mer by posting pickets c:1.t 
the entra n ce ·t o ·the sh i pyard . They d i d this bec e..:use the dry 
do ck ope /' a tor refused t o ;:;e rmit p i ckets to enter the dock in 
vrh i ch t he ship was moored . nDuring the pi cket ing , the union 
was a t a ll ti c1es careful to i ndi ca t e t hat its di spute was 
sole l y wi th the shipovmer .. " 22 _ s a r esult of the pic:ceting 
the employees of the dry do ck comp;:my refused t o 'ltlO r k on the 
ship . 
The Board dismi s sed the dry do ck company 's cha r ge of 
violat ion of g (b) (4) A by drawi ng-up a new set of standar ds 
f o r n i cketing . Picket ing , rul ed the Board , vms l av.rful if it 
me t the follovring conditions: 
~ ••. that (a) i t is stric t ly limited tn times when the 
situs of the d i spute is l 0c a ted o n the secondary em-
ployer 's pr em i ses , (b ) at the time of the p icketing the 
primary employer is engaged i n i ts normal busi ness a t 
tpe situs, (c) it i s limi"ced to pl a ce s reas onable clo se 
to the l ocation of the s i t u s , a nd (d) fue union d is-
c l oses clearly that the dispute i s v..rith the primar y 
employer . 23 
This is the st E1.nde.rd 1-vhich the Natbna l La bor Uelat ions 
Board now applies . 
2211 Secondo.ry Boycott s , n l'1onthly Labor Revie\'r (Februa ry, 
1951 ) , P• 200 .. 
23-Loc. c· · 
_. ]_"(, .. 
In the Denver Building Cas e , the rren th Circuit Court 
u phe l d a finding that Section 8 (b) ( LJ_)A Has viola t e d by a 
union c'i_uring a d is :· u t e Hi t h a nonuni on contractor on a con-
s t ruction :pr ojec t . Here, the union p icke t e d the main gate 
to t he o1rm e r t s pro ~)erty ~rhi ch 1vas the common entr::mce for the 
emp loyees o f the d is:;:n.1.t int:; contrac t o r and. the emp lo ye es of 
the 0\vne r a nd of a n e utral con trac to r on t h o pr o ject . '}ll-1e 
court noted that Hhile the union u s e d :p icke t s:i_cns naming 
on ~: y the pri mar y nonunion contr a c t o r as unf air , i ~: did not 
a ppropri a tely limit picketing t o his emplo yees . No permission 
Has sought to p icket t he nommion contrac to j·>~ s i mmediate "f:vork 
site inside the gate . Nor d i d the union p ick e t the j ob situs 
outside t h e fence vJhe i 'e only the p rimary contra ct o r 's er,1p loyees 
would h a ve b een affe c ted. 11 The Bm rd h a d concl u ded that the 
union thus had made . n o g ood-faith eff ort to comply 1r1i th tHo 
of t he Noore Dry Dock requi r ements in co:mmon s i tus situations. 11 24 
The ~r He r e t h at (1) p iclcets must b e 11 limited to p laces reasonably 
close to the loca tion of the s itus," and (2 ) "the union dis-
closes clear l y tha t tho dis pute is 1-,Ji th t h e pr i ma r y emp loyer. 11 
The ce n tral i ssue in t h e Service Trade Ch auffe urs Case 
11 Has the ex tent to 1-rhich Section 8 (b) ( 4 ) protect s "neutrals rr 
or 1 secondary 1 emp loyers Hhe re union action i s directed a g ainst 
2I' 
r--Tvrentieth Annual Hepo rt , Op . Cit., p . 138 
a t primary' emplo~rer 1.-vhose busine ss has a roving situs. • • • n25 
The Court r ealized that if unions vJere to be held for p icketing 
primary emp loyers in such situa tions because of the pos sible 
injury to "neutrals," "they would be deprived of a p m,rerful 
v-reapon which Conr;ress intended them t o have . 1126 Again we have 
affi rmation that preservation of a union's 11 primary rights" 
comes first. 
The U. s. Court of Appeals f o r the Di s trict of Columbia 
held in one ca s e tha t the Boar d could not, by r e f using to apply 
its common situs doctrine , -·~finQ:. a union guilty of a secondary 
boyco t t because the employer had a pl a ce of business in the 
area Hhich could be effectively picketed to publicize a labor 
di s pute . 27 
The union called a strike in protest against t he dis-
charge of several members by the emp loyer . It picketed his 
t1rJ"O p l ants and also followed deli ver y trucks t o variru s oth er 
empl oyers ' p Pemises and picketed the trucks while they were 
beinr:s unloaded. The signs carried by t he pi ckets stated that 
the dispute was entirely lvi th the truck ot-mer; this was the 
only communi cati on Hith the employees of the othe r employer 
while the trucks were being unloaded. The pickets stayed in 
25 
Nati onal Labor Relations Board, Seventeenth Ar1nual Report: 
1952 (Washington: Gov ernment Printir:g Office, 1952), p. 2I!-3. 
26 Loc. Cit. 
27sales Drivers, Helpers and Building Construction Drivers , 
Loca l 859 , AFL v. NLRB (C. A. D.C.) 
the area where the t rucks Her e unloa ding and continued only 
as long as the trucks we re t here . 
The Board ruled that p i clmting of the trucks amounted 
to an 1ml a-v1ful secondary boyco tt because 11 i t wa s des i gned t o 
enco u r a ge the emp lo yees of the o ther emp l oyers t o c;o on strike 
in o rder t o f o i'ce t he i r emp loyers t o cease doing bus i nes s 1-vi th 
the truck drivers' emp lo yer." 28 The Boal'd f e lt that the dis-
nute could have eff e c tive l y been adve :L' t i sed at the primary 
employe r's establishment . Follm~Ting of the trucks only served 
as an inducement fo i~ the secondary emp l oye e s to strike . The 
1.mion contended that the 11oo re Dry Dock 1~ules should appl y . 
The Court of Appeals, in upholding the union's con-
ten tion , r u l ed as fo llm-vs: 
The secondary b o y co t b an ••• do es not contain a 
p rov5. sion -v.rh ich condemns concerted a c t i vi ty of em-
p loyee s 1·1Ti th r espe c t t o t he ir own employers me rely 
becaus e it occurs at a p l a ce 1-rh e r e i t come s to the 
at"Sention of and i ncidentally affects emp lo yees of 
anothe r e ven when t he activity could b e carri ed on 
a t a place 1-vhere the primary e mployer a lone do e s 
business . The t est involved is whether the union 
a t tempts to induce t he emplo yees of another emp lo yer 
t o cause him t o ce ase doing business Hith the pri mary 
employe r. rrhe mere fact t h a t the p i cko ting took 
place at the common s l tus as 't·Jell as the pr i mary 
em~l loyer ' s r)remises l·JaS not en ough a lone t o ~lrove 
tht::d~ t he union had ma de s u ch an attempt and had 
t h e r eby violated the a c t .29 
28 
"Secondary Boy co t ts, 11 :rvronth ly Labor Revi evJ (February-, 
1952 ), pp . 199 - 200, c iti ng the NLRB Decision. 
29 rbid., p . 200 , ci t i n g Court of Appeals. 
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To surn.marize, t h en, there a re tvro t ypes o:f cases that 
occur i n such dis putes . The :first t~Je is that in which 
severa l employers use the s ame site , the so-called 11 common 
situs." In such situa tions the Board applies the Hoore- Dry 
Dock rules . I:f the striking union's e mp loyer is engaged in 
his normal business at the site, and t h e union state s tha t 
its dis·oute is solely vri t h the p r i mary emp loyer , then the sec-
ondary boycott p rovisiom o:f the act do not ap~')ly. The second 
t y-:Je o :f case is that in 't-Thich the e mployer's b u sine ss has a 
r oving situs . The c ourt has ruled tha t p rimary e mplo yee s can 
p icket the headquarters o:f their emp loyer as \-Tell as hi s roving 
situs , a s long as there is no concerted a ctivity to make sec-
ond8 ry emp lo :rees strike. 
I nducement of the emp loyees o f a secondary employer at 
or near the p remis e s of a p rimar y employer h a s been held by 
t he Sup reme Court a n d t he Board to be lav-rful a c tivity ( Rice 
1-U llin r; , Pure Oil, Ryan Construction, e tc.). Hence, those 
v;ho deliver or p ick u p g oo d s from a primary emp lo yer may be 
solici t ed with L'rnpun:L ty to refuse to p erform the ,,mrk. 
In either c a s e , i:f it can be p roved that there is an 
attemp t on the part o f t ho strikinr_r, union to ca use o thers to 
strike or cease doing business Hith the p r i mary employer, as 
long as t he QDion activity is not p rimary, then the secondary 
boy cott ·nrovis ions o:f the Ta:ft - Hartle y Act Hill ap ) l y , and, 
p rotection of t he 11 neutraln Hill be gu a ranteed . 
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VI. UNFAIR 
The use of the 11unfair 11 . list has been an. import ant 
union weapon in labor management ctisputes . The practice of 
classifying an employer as 11unfair 11 had its origin in the 
nineteenth century. There are two types of 11unfair 11 lists. 
A primary list is one which is posted at a local 1 s headquarters. 
A secondary list is one that is distributed outside of the union 
hall or one whose content is conveyed to secondary employees. 
The NLRB decisions have been somewhat nebulous but we gather 
that primary lists, as defined above, are legal and secondary 
lists, as defined above , are illegal. We find that the NLRB 
rules to protect 11neutrals, 11 for conveyance of information 
concerning the contents of an 11unfair 11 list is held to be 
in violation of Section 8 (b)(4)A. Since the Supreme Court 
ruling that Section 8 (b)(4)A of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act was constitutional and not an abridgement of free 
speech, organized labor has been decidedly restricted in its 
application of 11unfair, 11 and is, as result, weakened. 
Two classes of cases will be examined. The first cl e~ss 
are those in which an 11 unfair 11 list is used. The second type 
of case is that in which union action is directed towards the 
elimination of II II unfair goods in the production process. 
11Unfair List. 11 The National Labor Relations Board 
early concluded that the use of such lists to promote an il-
legal secondary boycott \'J'aJ.s prohibited;.;· At first, the Board 
•  
• 
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held that the listing of either a secondary employer or an 
employee with whom the union had a primary dispute was illegal . 
Later, the Board held that the secondary boycott ban does not 
p rohibit a union from merely listing an employer with whom it 
30 has a direct dispute. The Bo ard felt that this type of 
listing was analagous to picketing the primary employer's. 
plant, but 11 the decision did not disturb the Board's prior 
ruling that the placing of a secondary employer on an unfair 
list may be, in itself, a violation of the secondary boycott 
b 1131 an. 
As a result, the Board, in the Meat Cutters Case, re-
versed a trial examiner's finding that the union's 11 int ernal 
operation 11 in connection with the listing of an employer as 
11unf e.ir 11 was primary and, therefore, lawful. 32 The union's 
conduct was alleged to h~ve violated the act when the union 
agent had his secretary call union members employed at various 
meat markets to inform them that a meat wholesa.ler had been . 
p laced on an II II unf air list. The Board held that it was "in-
ducement and encouragement 11 within the meaning of the a ct. 
The Bo ard's unanimous opinion on the l awfulness of the 
"internal operation 11 wa s as follo ws : 
There is valid support in practical human experience 
although perhaps not in abstract logic, for prohibiting 
30Fifteenth Annual Report, ~- Cit., p. 145. 
31Loc. Cit . 
32Amalgama ted Meat Cutters Union No. 303 93 NLRB 336. 
a union, as 't.Y e h ave done, from telling a specific em-
ployee at his place of work about an unfair list, and 
yet holding the promulgation of that unfair list at 
a union meeting to be unlawful. In effectuating the 
evident purpose of Congress to permit primary action 
1-vhil e prohibiting secondary inducement~ 1.~1e cannot 
escape clra\'lling a line somel'llhere so as to preserve a 
proper area in which both congressional objectives 
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can but be fulfilled. As we indicated in the Grauman 
cBse ( 87 NLRB 755-19 49), it is traditional primary 
action for a union, within its own councils, to cla ssify 
a primary employer as unf air, where A. S conveying t he sam e 
information to a s econc1ary empl oyer's emp loyee a t his 
pl a ce of wor k a ssumes the a sp ect of unlawful s econdar y 
inducement t ant amount to a sp ecific direction to cea s e 
work. 33 
Not only do unions apply the t erm 11unfair 11 to emp l oyers, 
but also to nonunion goods. There is a difference b et ween the 
preceding ca se and the one to follow. In the former, it 'to'J a s a 
matter of conveying information to secondary employers wherea s 
in the latter, it is a matter of concerted refusal to h andle 
nonunion goods. Although the dispute is betwe en a primary 
employer and his emp loyees, the courts have ruled that such 
action is prohibited. It is an illustration of a situation in 
which a union is deprived of what it considers a 11 l awful 
primary right. 11 
II A 11Unf air Applied to Nonunion Goods. union caused its 
members to leave a shingle plant after the arrival of a Canadien 
34 
shipment of nonunion shingles. This was done so as to elimi-
33Ns,tional Labor Relations Bo ard, Sixteenth Annual 
Report: 1951 (Washingt on: Government Printing Office, 1951), 
p. 225. 
34 . NLRB v. l'la. shin~ton-Oregon Shingle ~V eaver 1 s District 
Council 2llf.2d 1 49 (C.A.9). 
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nate the use of 11 unfair 11 Canadian shingles from U.S . markets. 
The Court sustained the Board's finding that the union's act 
was a violation of the secondary boycott provisions of the 
Taft:...Hartley Act. The union claimed tha t it had no direct 
dispute with the Canadian producer . The Court pointed out 
that the manifest object of the \\iork stoppage was to compel 
the complaining employer to ceas e using the product of e.noth er 
company 1 an object which is clearly prohibited by the secondary 
boycott section. But in Douds vs. Sheet Metal Workers, which 
is discuss ed. b elow 1 employees went on strike to force their 
employers to cease using nonunion r adia tor enclosures. The 
Court refused to issue an injunction on the ba sis that the 
di spute was between 1he primary employees and the p rimary em-
players. Up to this time, no effort has been mc de to decide 
"toihich decision shall prevail. 
To summarize, the National Labor Rele.tions Board allows 
II 
unions to classify an employer as "unfair 1 but when this 
information is conveyed to a secondary party, it becomes un-
lawful action. Therefore, the secondary party is prot ected 
II 
from the coercive device of the "unfair list. 
As for action compelling a primary employer not to use 
the products of another, future decisions will be the guide. 
VII. REStn·1E 
In reviewing the cas es presented in this chapter, we 
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note t hat the most serious p roblems facing the National Labor 
Relations Board and the Courts are (1) defining a 11 neutra1 11 
and ( 2) protecting the 11primary mee.ns \'Jhich unions traditionally 
use to press their demands on an employer. II Once these problems 
are resolved, the Board. and the Courts rule either to protect 
the 11 neutral, II or to uphold the union action as being primary 
in nature. It is evident, then, that preserv~tion of 11lawful 
II primary act ion on the part of unions precedes the protection 
~ 
of a II II neutral in a dispute. Whenever the Board or Courts 
rule to protect the third party, labor looses the use of the 
weapon employed, thereby weakening its position. 
Decisions concerning the first problem arise in cases 
in which the unions cl aim that the secondary employer is not 
a disinterested party, that he is an 11 ally 11 of the primary 
employer. If the union is able to prove this claim, the 
Board, in the Irwin-Lyons Lumber Case, 35 will rule that as 
the union action is not secondary. If the union is unable 
to do so' as in the Marsh Foodliners Case, 
36 
the union will 
be held for violation of the boycott section of the act. 
Decisions defining 11 lawful primary action 11 on the part 
of unions occur very frequently. If the Board or the Courts 
rule that union action is primary, such action will be per-
missible even if it has secondary effects. The Pure Oil Case 
35P • 36 , Supra . 
36P. 38, S ·upra . 
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is an example of this. 37 
Further definition of primary action occurs in 11unfai r 11 
c a s es. The courts h ave ruled that listing of an employer is 
not, in itself, secondary action. If t he information is con-
veyed to a secondary employer's employee, it is unlat-J ful. 
So far, we h ave observed that the Bo ard and the Courts 
hav e att empted to permit primary action while prohibiting 
secondary inducement. Vve can conclude tha t Section 8 (b) (4 ) 
doe s protect "neutrals 11 in industrial disputes with thi s 
II qualifica tion; "neutrals will not be protected if the p ro-
t ection infringes on a n union's l awful primary activity as 
definded by Taf t-Hartley. Having thus est ablished tha t 
Section 8 (b)(4) A qualifie0~y protects II II neutrals, then it 
fol l ows that organized labor is we akened a s a result. 
Before drawing a final conclusion, analysis of t h e 
criticisms and proposed amendments suggested by management 
and l abor will shed furth er light on Section 8 (b)( 4 }A, its 
intention, its provisions, and its effects on labor. 
37p ~2 
• 0 , Supra . 
• 
• 
CHAPTER IV 
CRITICIS1-1S AND PROPOSED AMEN D1JI ENTS1 OF 8 (b) (4) A 
We had previously concluded that Section 8 (b) ( 4 )A does 
protect "neutrals 11 in industrial disputes with the qualification 
tha t primary a ction on the part of unions t akes precedence over 
t he protection of the disinterested third party. Aside from 
protection of a union ' s 11primary rights, 11 it is clea r tha t 
the outlaw ing of seconda ry boycotts weakens l abor. The argu-
ment would not be complete, however, without presenting the 
views of ma nagement and labor for (1) labor claims that the 
Section forces them 11 to contribute to their own self-destruc-
tion, 11 and, therefore, the Section not only 1tJeakens labor•, 
but is destructive in its intent, and (2) management cla i ms 
that th e Section ha s many loopholes and, therefore, unions 
are not much affected. Analysis of these claims in necessary, 
for they directly a ffect the argument of this section. 
The recent decision of the 'O~rcu1..t Court concerning 11hot 
cargo" contracts will also be cliscussed. Unanimity of purpose 
on labor's part in desiring such clauses in collective b a r-
gaining agreements gives rise to certa in problems, one of which 
is the possibility by labor, of avoiding p rosecution under 
8 (b) (4) A • 
lcomplet e stt'3.tement of individuals cited in this chapter 
ar e rep eated_ in Appendix C of this paper. 
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I. LABOR'S CRITICISM 
Union leaders and others vehemently opposed the b a n on 
secondary boycotts. They believed that the a ct forced them 
11 to contribute to their self-destruction, 11 2 that it was a 
11 slave labor 11 l a'VJ, that 1 t abrogated the union 1 s right to 
protect tt s living standards, etc. They claimed that there 
were second2.ry boycotts tha t were j u s t ified and that there 
were secondary boycotts that were unjustified. 
The a rgument for a distinction between certain typ es 
of boycotts was not only prevalent before the pas s age of the 
a ct, but also in 1953 when a Senate Committee conducted 
hearings on Taft-Hartley Revisions. Senator Taft explained 
that in the weeks of hearings prior to the drafting of the 
bill, the committee 11 ••• never succeeded in having anyone 
tell us any difference betwe en different k inds of secondary 
boyootts~1 3 Hillis and Brown point out that a "number of 
witnesses ' proposed si gnificant distinctions, 1 one of whom 
was Secretary of Labor Schwellenba ch. 114 
These vie1vs are of interest because the more rational 
critics of the act were of the opinion that there were some 
seconde.ry boycotts tha t were undesirable, but not a ll. 
2congressional Report on the Taft-Hartley Act, Monthly 
Labor Review (May 1948), p. 530. 
3Harry A. Hillis a nd Emily Cl ark Brown, From the Vlagner 
Act to the Taft-Hart lev Act ( Chica,go, University of Chicago 
PresS: 1950~. 466, citing the Congressional Record. 
4 Loc. Cit. 
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President Truman, in his "State of the Union Hes s age 11 
on J anuary 6, 1947, stated: 
... Not all secondary boycotts a re unjustified. We 
must judge them on the ba sis of their objectives. For 
example, boycotts intended to protect wage rates and 
working condit io ns should b e distinguished from those 
in furth erance of jurisdictional disputes. The 
structure of industry sometimes r equires unions a s 
a matter of self-preservation to extend the conflict 
beyond a particular employer. There should be no 
bl nnk et prohibition against boycotts. The appropriate 
goal is legisla tion which prohibits secondary boycotts 
in p ursuance of unjustifi able objects, but does not 
impair the union 1 s right to p reserve its own existen c e 
and the gains made in genuine collective bargaining . 
In J anua.ry, 1954 , President Eisenhower listed "Fourteen 
Point s f or Indus tria l Pee.ce. 115 Like President Truman , he i s 
in f cvor of maki ng some secondary boycotts 1 egal. If ena cted, 
the cha~ge could bring about this situation: The work er s in 
plant X go on strike. Plant X manufactures mechanical parts 
'\vhich are shipped to pl ant Y for further processing. The union 
c an order its members in plant Y to stop work on the 
s ets, therby decrea sing plant X's business. The rea son for 
p roposing such an a llowance is that fellow union members 
should not be forced to work on 11hot goods, 11 thereby aiding 
employer X. 
Hr. 0. A. Kni ght, President of the Oil Harkers 1 Inter-
national Union, CIO, felt tha t 11 one of the most disturbing 
features of the act 11 was Section 8 (b)(4) A. He felt tha t 
511 Fourteen Points for Industri a.l -Peace, 11 U. 5 . :N cn-vs 
and World Report, J anua ry 27, 1954, pp . 93-94. 
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there were some boycotts "which e.re cl.ist a steful and wrong , 11 
but he, too, believed that not all boycotts should be pro-
6 hibi ted . 
Arthur J . Goldberg , General Counsel of the CI O, stated 
tha t unions are legi timately enti tled to protect their living 
standards . He concluded his t estimony before the U. S. Senat e 
Committee on Taf t-Hart ley Revision by st ating : 7 
.. . I s a r efu s e_l by employees to work on goo ds coming 
from another employer becaus e that employer has sought 
to avoid uni on wag e scales and wo r king conditions by 
moving to a new loca tion, or because he maintains a 
sw eat shop and pays subst andard wages any less r ight than 
their refusal to h andl e struck work? No f c_ir-mi nded 
p erson could argue tha t this is the case ...• The 
provisions of Section 8 (b)(4) should ei ther be elimina ted 
from the act or drasti cally amended to remove t heir anti-
un i on effects. 
Elia s Li eber man writes tha t if the LJ:Ht.~ sponsors had 
attemp t ed to seek a solution to union abuse s only to the ex-
tent nec essar y , the a c t would have been much more widel y 
e ccepted . He suggests that the sponsors 'tAJished to undermine 
11 1 egi tima t e union activities , 11 an d he cites secondary boycotts 
<l S an example. 8 
6United States Congress, Joint Committee on Labor-
N _nag ement Relations, Labor-Hanagem ent Rel at ions , Vol . 2: 
1948 (Washington: Government Pri nting Office, 1948) , p. 771. 
7 United States Congress, Senate Committee on Labor and 
Public itlelfare, Taft-H artle;y Act Revisions: 1953 ( Washington : 
Goverrunent Printing Of f ice, 1953), p . 460. 
8Lie-berman , QQ. cit., p . 327. 
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Had the sponsors of the Taf t-Hartley Act addressed them-
selves to seeking a fair solution to these problems and 
curbing union activities i n thHt di rection only to the 
extent necessary , they would have be en supported by a 
l arg e public. But, capi t alizing on the p revailing p ub-
li c sentiment, the sponsors took advant age of it, a.nd: 
in stead of limiting t hemselves to the re stri ction of 
unions' objectionable activities along the se lines , 
forg ed a legi s l ative instrument f or effectively under-
mining basic l egitimate union activities . Under the 
pre tense of curbin g obj actionable secondary boycotts, 
they prohibited all secondary boycotts. Thus, the 
authors i ntended tha t if employer Jones, against t'IJhom 
a legitimat e strik e i s in p ro gress has his work per-
formed by employer Br·o ~<m , e, strUr.e against Brown in an 
ef f ort to p r event him d.oing Jones 1 struck \vork be p ro-
h i bited as a secondar y boycott activity. Th e workers 
in B l"0111111 1 s shop , though they and Jones 1 strH=.ers be 
members of the s erne union , must not refuse to p erf'orm 
Jones ' work. Thus they are compelled to help brecl~ 
the stri k e of their co-union workers in Jo nes' shop . 
One area in which there is desire for exempt ion from 
the proscription of Section 8 (b)(4)A is the construction 
industry. Unions are most bitter over the Bo ard and Court 
decisions in the construction industry. The problem is whether 
a general contra ctor and his subcontractors are separat e 
employers when working on the s ame ·construction project or a r•e 
they "allied 11 or 11 one 11 '? The answer vJill determine whether a 
union's activity, a imed a t breaking the business relations 
between a general contractor and any of his subcontra ctors, 
is a viol at ion of Section 8 {b)( 4 )A and thus a secondary 
boycot t , or whether it is no viola tion and permissable under 
the ,stet. The situation may b e interpreted a s a dispute be tween 
the union and t he nonunion subcontractor, based on the l atter' s 
r efusal to use union l abor, in which case the general contractor 
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and the other subcontractors are 11 neutrals; 11 or it may be 
regarded as a dispute between the union, due to the l at ter's 
he.vi ng done business vJ ith the nonunion subcontrt::J.ctor in ·which 
cas e no one is 11 neutral. 11 
Judge Cl ark of the Uni ted_ States Court of App eals, 
dissenting in the Electrical Work ers Case sta ted tha t the 
building trades present a unique si tua tion.9 A workingm an 
in the construct ion industry may be employed by different 
contractors from week to week . If the pr ac ti ce of hiring non-
union men is tolerated, Judge Clark sa id, unionmen will stand 
le ss chance of being employed a t union r a,t es . He go es on to 
s ay tha t every union construction worker ha s a g enuine dispute 
with all contractors on the site since the worker is seeki ng 
to force them to act for his long-range benefit by not hiring 
nonunion subcontractors. 
The Board ha s come to the conclusion that contractors 
and subcontractorsare to be regarcted as separ a t e employ ers . 
Therefore, a union tha t goes on strike because a subcontractor 
had nonunion men on the job is guilty of an unfair l abor pr a c-
tic e . 
The Supreme Court 1 s argument is ba sed primarily on the 
fact tha t one of the striking union's objectives is to force 
termination of the business relationship between the g eneral 
9 International Brotherhood v. NLRB , 181 F. 2d 34, 40, 
25 LRRM 2449 • 
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con tractor and the nonunion sub con tractor, e.no. a ction with 
this objective is prohibited by the Act. Therefore, the sit-
u a tion is determined as a d.ispute b etiveen t he union a nd the 
nonunion subcontractor, all other contractors being 11 neutrals." 
To dat e, Congress has not dre.wn a ny distinction bet ween 
different t yp es of boycotts.l0 It is important to note tha t 
if such a distinction could be drawn, l a t'l}ful p rimary action 
on t he p art of unions 1<Jould b e extended a.nd f e'tv er emp loy ers 
i.vould. be considered 11 true neutrals, 11 for example, constructors 
on a construction p roject. 
On the other h and, Georg e W. Taylor writes tha t t he 
outlawing of all seconda ry boycotts was desig ned p rimarily to 
eliminate this economic pow er because "the results were d eemed 
to be i mp roper. 11 Sp ecifically, some secondary boycotts \'J ere 
used to force emp loyees to join unions. But , if this were 
the objective of Congress, then there would be no justifica-
tion for outlav.Jing Section 8 (b ) ( 4 ) A boycotts, such as t hose 
used to p ut p ressure on the p rime,ry employer to give into 
union demands f or h igher wages . vie can only conclude that 
outl aw i ng of all secondary boycotts wa s clesigned to p rot ect 
II II II • It 
neutral s , not b ec ause of 1mproper r esults, a nd. by do ing 
so, weak ened. labor. 
Th erefor•e, l abo r' s cas e is tha t ther e e.re some seconda ry 
10
see "hot Ca rgo 11 discussion below. 
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boycotts which should be allo'tved. Labor leac1ers and l abor 
symp a thizers have af f irmed tha t the outlavJing of all secon-
dary boycotts has mad.e it more diff icult for them to gain 
t he ends they desire. For this rea son, they wan t distinctions 
dravm b ett.v e en boycotts so that those 'tvhich are initia ted to 
r a ise wag es or imp rove working conditions be allowed . This 
wish on 1 bor 1 s part is p roof enough tha t Section 8 (b){ 4 )A 
h a s h ad an a dvers e eff ect on l abor•' s bargaining position. 
Even though l abor h a s cla i med. tha t 8 (b)(4) A is d e-
structi ve in ef f ect 1 ma nagement cla ims tha t union .s a r e able 
to a void the pro s criptions of the section and, therefore, 
a re not much affected. The follo wing section p r es ents the se 
a r guments. 
II. MAN ... GEMENT 1 S CRITICISM 
In 1953, when the hearings on the Ta ft-Hartley Revisions 
rJ ere conducted, several represent a tives of managem ent a ssocia -
, _ 
tions t e stified. Of interest to u.s, are the sta t emen t s of 
Powell C. Groner, Chamber of Commerce of the United St a tes, 
Rich ~rd P . Doherty, Vice President o f the National As socia tion 
of Ra dio a nd TV Bro a dc a sters and George H. Armst r ong, Jr. 1 
Chai rman o f t h e Industri a l Rel o.tions Committee, National 
Association of Hanufa ct u. r ers. Ea ch of t h ese individual s 
p roposed am endm ents a nd/or suggestions for araendm ent of 
Section 8 (b )( 4 ) of the act. None of these men felt tha t 
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"the evil pl"' a.ct ic e vJhich Congress intended to outlaw h a d 
been completely eliminated. They beli ev ed tha t un ion s wete 
B.b le to a voi d t he proscriptions of the Section, and as e. re-
sult, unions could still put pressure on 11 neutrals. 11 
Hr . Groner wanted the 11 serious gaps 11 in the Section 
i mprov ed so a s 11 to prevent the evil pra ctices which Congress 
intended to outl <?.w. nll But he does a cl.mit tha t if t h ere i s 
any equity to the union cla i m tha t unions ha ve to act 11 a s 
s trik ebreakers a ga in s t members of the s ame union, 11 the 
"l egisl at ion shoulcl be carefully d r awn to p ermit no weakening 
of the a ct 1 s b a sic anti-boycott provisions. 1112 
Mr. Doherty, of the Nat iona l Association of Ra dio and 
TV Broadcasters, point s out tha t 1 egi sla tion should "a cte qu at ely 
cover the implementing t a ctics used by unions. nl3 They are : 
(1) Refusals to p roc e ss or to perform services. 
( 2 ) Picketing of the third party. 
( 3) Unfair lists. 
( 4 ) Threa ts aga inst man a gement. 
(5) Agreements between a union and an emp loyer . 
1Jir. Doher ty prop os es tha t Section 8 ( b ) ( 4 ) be amencled 
so as to prevent the oc currenc e of the five i mplementing 
t a ctics. 
Hr. Ar mstrong of the Na tiona.l Asso cia tion of l•lanu-
f a cturers claims that there i s no ju s tifi cation fo r seconda ry 
llibid .' pp . 166-1 67. 
1 9 
LOC. Cit . 
13r· d 8 
_QL_. ' p . 1 4. 
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boycotts. 14 
If n a tional l abor pol:tcy is des i gned. to en able em-
p l oye es to express t heir own choice 'tvi th r e s~)ect to 
self-organization an c'l collective b ar gaining agreements, 
there c Rn be no justification v11hatso.ever for t h e sec-
ondary boycot ts. The s eco ndary boycott is a vicious 
exercise of p ower. It stops p roduction, p uts em-
p lo y ees out of work without regard to their own free 
choice, results in violation of collective bargaining 
agreements, penalizes employee s by loss of vv a ·es, t:md 
involves extensiv e costs for the employer, sometimes 
to the extent of destroying his business. 
He e.rgues tha t when a 11 seconda r y boycott i s ce.rried on 
a t a, primary site, 11 it interferes with t he relntionsh:tps be-
t~:v een the primary employer and seconda x•y employers . He be-
lieves that this and other 11 so-calle<l loopholes 11 should be 
do n e away vd th by amen dment to the a ct . 
I f Congress had emended the Section to the s a t i sf act i on 
of l>lanagement , l abo r \vould h av e lost ri ghts vJhich it al1v1-1ys 
had . For exa1nple, unions i:voul cl b e held for not crossing 
p icket lines or not performing services, or for making cgree-
ments 1•! ith employers . Payment f'or 11 c a.nned music 11 equa_l to 
the payment for 11 liv e music 11 is one such agreement that would 
become illegal. Congress would be extending its protection 
to 11 neutrals, 11 but i n doing ·so would further confuse the 
definition of the nebulous term "n eutral, 11 and. itJe <:tken l abor 
to an even greater extent. 
Absent from management• s criticism, "trtJere 11hot cergo 11 
cl <.uses. A s a. result of the Circuit Court of Appeals decision 
14Ibid., p . 269. 
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on such clauses 1 th e 11 hot ca r go tt discussion h a s a ssumed over--
riding i mp ortance . 
III. HOT CARGO 
The ultima te obj ect ive of the secondary boycott is the 
economic isola tion of the primary emn l oyer. I solation of the 
l) rima ry employer is legal and per·rnissible as lo ng as the union 
repres enting the p rimary empl oy ees does not a ttempt to p ut any 
pressure on s econ da r y empl oyers . On e of organized l abor 1 s 
greatest criticisms of the Taft-Hartley Act is tha t the union 
r:J emb ers of t he seconcl nr y empl oy er may inadv el"tent l y aid the 
pri mary emp loy er in h i s fight against fellow union members by 
worl\.ing on struck or· tthot ca rgo 11 • Labor man ifested a desire 
to h ave the Act BJnend.ed so a s to p ermit secondary employees 
to refuse to work on struck goods . 
Thos e unions whi ch were able to get a 11 hot cargo" pro-
vision written i nto their contract s, a provision tha t the 
contract i ng employ er agrees not to us e or h andle, not to re-
quire hio employee s to use or h andle goo ds "t'Jhich are proc l a imed 
to be "unfair , 11 e::tre abl e to effect a boycott 1.vithout viola.ting 
t h e l aw . The Ac t proscribes the fo rcing or coercing of sec-
ondary emp l oyer s , but there was some question as to whet h er 
11 hot ce .. r go 11 clau ses "ttJere a ma tter of coel"cion. 
The end object to be a chieved by a 11hot c a r go 11 pro-
vision in a contract is p recisely the s aJn e a.s that vJhich the 
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union, in a,bsence of such contract, could a chieve only by 
a ct ual p icketing of the secondB.ry employer:. 11 The advantages 
of shifting the burden of the boy-cott, so to speak , -u.pon the 
secondary employer a l"e patent . 1115 It is said that unions 
have no other means a t its disposa l as simple as this type 
of cl;-:~u se for effecting l arge boycotts. Immaterial as to 
whether or not the contract is voluntary, Rothenberg st a,tes 
that--16 
..• it seems p lain and. evident that a union vJhich re-
quires a third person not involved in the controversy 
to boycott the primary disput ant employer is guilty of 
a secondary boycott. It is immaterial that the third 
person ' s consent is extracted in advance or that it is 
achieved by contra ctual contrivance. If a. violation 
of the law is involved, it is neither justifica tion nor 
exonera tion tha t the consent 't-Ja s elicited in anticioa-
tion of the misdemeanor. Nor is there any persuasive 
rea son why a secondary boycott should be p l aced any 
further beyond the rea ch of the l aw than e.ny other. vio-
l a tion merely because it receives mention in a contra ct. 
In the e arly part of 1957, the U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals in the Teamsters v. Crowley's Hilk Company case, 
ruled that 11hot cargo II clauses were legal, and therefore, 
permissible. It is still too early to detel"mine wha t effect 
or effects of such a decision will be, but there are some 
interesting problems posed by the decision. 
It a union desires to have a uhot cargo 11 clause 
15 I. Herbert Rothenberg, 11 Cooling the I Hot Cargo I Con-
tract, 11 Labor Law Journal, 18:4, April, 1956. 
16 Loc. Cit. 
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written into its contract, and the employer refuses on the 
grounds that he will be a ffected by labor disputes 11ili.ich he 
is not a party to, will pressure by the union (strik es, 
p icketing, etc.) be construed a s an eff ort to make the em-
ployer party to an inctustrial controversy, thereby losing 
t h e p rotection of Section 8 (b)(4)A? In other words, if the 
employer does not volunt ar•ily agree to such a clause, but is 
force d to include it in the contract because of economic 
pressure from the union, will he lose the protection guar an-
teed him under Section 8 (b)(4)A? 
Also, the import of the Court decision is tha t a 
secondary boycott is legal as long a s there is a 11hot cargo 11 
clause written into the collective bargaining agreement. Under 
such circumstances, then the Congressional attempt to 11 outlaw 11 
secondary boycotts will hav e be en to no avail. But bec ause 
Section 8 (b) (4)A wa s designed to protect 11 neutrals, 11 those 
11 neutrals 11 who agree to the clause 'tvill be indicating tha.t 
they do not wish protection, a t least those who have volun-
t arily agreed to the clause. 
The object of a secondary boycott is economic isola tion 
of the primary employer; secondary boycotts are defined a s 
coercive devices forcing second13,ry employers not to do busi-
ness with the primary employer; with 11hot c argo 11 contr cts, 
the objective of a secondary boycott can be achieved 1rJ i thout 
the u sua l devices used for attaining one; if all unions are 
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e.ble to include in their contra cts 11hot ca rgo 11 provisions , 
e e.ch employer 'tvill be automatically isolated in time of in-
dustrial dispute; no one could bring charges before the National 
Labor Relations Board. 
It is not conceivable tha t all employers will agre e to 
such contra cts--the problem will be over those employers who 
a re forced to agree. In the Douds v. Sheet He t a l \'/orkers, 
applica tion for an i n junction vJas denied 't'11hen the court ruled 
tha t the dispute was between the primary employer and his 
employees .l7 The union had gone on strike to force the em-
ployer to use union made goods. This case is similar to the 
p rob lem under discussion in tha t it is envisag ed tha t unions 
will be striking to force emp loyers to write in 11hot ca r go 11 
clauses. The princip le is the s~ne in both cases; whether 
Douds v. Sheet Hetal Workers will set a precedent is a matter 
for specul a tion. 
IV • Silllf14ARY 
I n this chapter, labor and management op inions on 
Section 8 (b)(4) A were presented . I n brief, management wants 
t he Section exten ded so as to outlaw strikes which have sec-
oncta ry effects as t.vell as certa in 11loopholes 11 , 'tvheree.s l abor 
desires to have the application of the Section limited to 
17Discussed above. 
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certain types of boycotts , not all . Management feels that 
the Section o.oes not substcmtially i-Jeak en l abor ; l a bor feels 
tha.t the Section is destructive. Arguments were p resented 
to show that labor's claims concerning the adverse effect of 
the Section h ave validity . 
The decision on 11 hot cargo 11 clauses and the p ossible 
results and p roblems incurred by the ruling were discus sed. 
It was po inted out that the Court ruling might very well 
have p rovided a 11 loophole 11 for l abor. Not enough time 
has passed to enable us to judge the effects of the decision; 
therefore, at the present :bime , l abor ' s position ha.s not been 
a ltered by the Court decision. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMJ:.~ARY AND CONCLUSIONS ON 8 (b) (4) A 
At the beginning of the discussion on secondary boy-
cotts , it was contended t hat Section 8 (b) ( 4 ) affords pro-
tectio n to 11 neutrals 11 in industrial disputes as long as tha t 
pro tection does not interfere with a union ' s prim r y rights. 
Thus f a r, we h ave noted that the National Labor Rela tions 
Boai'd. a ncl the Courts h ave act eo. in accordance 'tvi th the in-
tent of the Section , that i s , to protect disinterested third 
parties . By ruling so, l abor looses an economic weapon--
the secondary boycott. 
I n ca ses thRt have arisen, the Board and the Courts 
have found it necessary to an swer the following questions : 
(1) Is the third party directly involvecl in the c1ispute'? 
( 2) Is the union engaged in 11 lcnvful p rimary action'? 11 
Such were the questions the.t h a c1 to b e answere d in 
several of the cases pres ented. in 'chis p ap er. The former ques-
tion i mplies that if the third P~tl"'ty ls directly involved in 
t he cllspute as in the Ir't-Jin-Lyons Lumber Compa ny Ca se , 1 · t h en 
the third party cannot be considered a 11 n eut r al. 11 The l a t ter 
question imp li es that if the unio n is engaged in 11 l a:t11ful 
primary action, 11 the third party cannot be protect eeL If the 
answer is no to both questions , then both the Bo a r d and the 
1 supra, p . 36 . 
Courts act according to the intent of Congress. Protection 
of the 11 neutral 11 is gu a r anteed. 
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The Labor ~1anagement Relations Act was passed in 19 47. 
Section 8 (b )( 4 ) of the Act was intended to protect disinteres-
ted third partie s in industrial disputes . We have shown that the 
National Labor Relations Board a nd the Courts have a cted with 
this intention in mind as long as 11primary right.s 11 of labor 
i'Jere preserved. \Vi th the exception of preservation of 11pri-
me.ry rights , 11 labor's strength h as been weB.kened by Section 
8 (b) ( 4 ) •• 
Because a secondary boycott can do a great deal of 
economic damage to a secondary employer before the case is 
reviewed by the Nat ional Labor Relations Boe.rd, the LHRA 
provides for injunctive relief in such cases. The following 
section 'tvill be a consideration of this type of injunction 1 
of how it ·works , of its effects, and plans to ta.ke its ple. ce. 
CHAPTER VI 
SECTIOF 10 (1) AND HYPOTHESIS 
I. SECTION 10 (1) 
Section 10 (1) of the Labor Me.nagement Relations Act 
of 1947 provides for injunctive relief in cases in which there 
is 11 reasonable cause to believe 11 that charges brought against 
a union for possible violation of Section 8 (b)(4) subsections 
A, B, C, are true. 1 
\Vhenever an employer believes that the union representing 
his employees is engaged in a violation of Section 8 (b )( 4), 
subsections A, B, C, of the Act, he can petition the General 
Counsel of the Nat ional Labor Relations Board for injunctive 
relief. If the Gen.eral Counsel by his regional attorney "has 
reasonable cause to believe such chnrge is true and that a com-
plaint should issue, 11 he will p etition a district court of the 
United States for injunctive relief. The Court may issue a 
tempora.ry five day restl"aining order while the facts are being 
reviewed provided t hat 11 substantial and irreparable 11 c1e.mage 
will result if the order is not issued. If, following such a 
review, the Court rules that the union action will adversely 
affect 11 the full flo't'J of commerce and hence the general welfal"e, n2 
1 see complete st a tement of Section 10 (1) i n App endix A. 
') 
'""'Ls.bor Rel at ions Reference Manual, Volume l!o. 21 , 11/1/47 
to 4/30/ 48 ( ~17ashington, Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. , 1948 ), 
p . 2283 . 
• 
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an injunction will be issued. This injunction will r emai n i n 
effect until the ca se is decided by the National Labor Relations 
Board. 
II. HYPOTHESIS 
It is the contention of this section that once an in-
junction is issued because of suspected violation of Section 
8 (b)(4) A under the provision of Section 10 (1), particularly 
in the construction industry, the success of the l abor org~n-
iza tion involved. in the dispute will var y inv ersely with the 
length of the injunction. 
Substantiation of the hypothesis \'Jill involve analyses 
of the number of disputes settled bef ore the decision of the 
National Labor Rela tion Board along with other pertinent 
dat a , the "st atus quo 11 problem which is directly rel a ted to 
the length of time injunctions remain in effect 1 and fin a.lly 1 
the employment of the General Counsel a s the intermedia ry in 
obt a ining injunctions. 3 
By 11 sta tus quo 11 we mean the situation that exists e.f ter 
t h e is suance of the injunction but before the decision of the 
Fat i onal La.bor Rela tions Bo aro. . This situa tion is created by 
the issuance of the injunction . 
3United St a tes Congress, Senate Committee on Labor and 
Public Vvelfare, 83rd Congress, First Ses sion on Proposed Re-
visions of the Labor Hane.gement Relations Act of 1947: Part I, 
MCJ.rch 24 , 25, 26, 30 and 31, 1953 (\vashington: Government 
Printing Office 1953) p. 461 (St a tement of Arthur J. Goldberg , 
Gener al Counsel, Congress of Industrial Organizations), p. 510 
( St a tement of Hon. Hubert H. Humphrey). 
CHAPTER VII 
INJUN CTIONS 
AMOUNT, DURATION AND RELATED DATA 
Through the fiscal years 1948 to 1955, 280 mandatory 
injunction ca ses have b een instituted. Of this number, 118 
injunctions have been granted, representing forty-two per 
cent of the total injunction cases. - This figure does not 
give a very accurate picture of the percentage of injunctions 
granted, for in 101 cases, the unions suspended the activiti es 
they were suspected of, with the result that injunction proceed-
ings were discontinued. Teking the 101 discontinuance s into 
consideration, we then find that injunctions were issued in 
sixty-five per cent of the ca ses to come before the Federal 
Courts . 
Thirty-six p er cent of the injunctions were issued in 
construction disputes. Grouped under the construction category 
are construction 11110rkers, electrical 'l.'110rkers, plumbers, brick-
l ayers, etc. The remaining sixty-four per cent of the injunctions 
were split up e..mong a irdde variety of l abor orga,nizations, with 
the Teamsters, Longshoremen and the 1-iine Vforkers receiving the 
major share. 
Of the 118 mandatory injunctions granted during the 
first eight years of the Taft-Hart ley Act, decisions '{,.Jere 
issued by the National Labor Relations Board in approximately 
seventy-five. 1 The National Labor Rela tions Board rendered 
a decision in less t han three months in eleven per cent 
or eight of the cases. Sixty-eight per cent or fifty-one 
of the cases were decided in more than three months but less 
than thirteen months. Decisions in t wenty-two percent or 
s i xteen of the cases were rendered later than one year af ter 
the is sus.nce of the injunction. In one case , the National 
LB.bor Rel ations Board. gave a decis i on one month after the 
issuance of the injunction. On the other hand, one injunction 
r• emained in effect for a little more than t'venty-four months . 
On the average , there is a delay of seven months in giving 
ciecisions. 
One hundred t1.venty-seven of the 280 ca,ses instituted 
wer e settled before the Federal Court decision or soon after 
t he issuance of the injunction. The rea sons for settl ement 
of t he disputes were (1) bece.use of settlement of the 
dispute between management and labor, or (2) because of 
t he suspension of the suspected unfB.ir labor p ractices. 
The first observa tion that one c an make is tha t more 
oft en than not, when injunction proceedings un der Section 
lTwenty-six cases were discontinued before reaching 
the National Labor Rel ations Board, and in seventeen c a.ses, 
either decisions had not yet been rendered by the Board or 
da t a wa s not available. 
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10 (1) are instituted , a.n injunction will be issued against 
the union. Coupling this vJith the fe.ct tha t on the 2.ver•age 
the c1uration of injunctions is seven months , 1t.J e might inf er 
tha t l abor organiza tions will be inclined to 11 give up 11 once 
the injunction p roceedings a re st arted or soon after t he 
issuance of the injunction. This would a ccount f or the f nct 
that 127 ca ses out of 280 'tvere settlec.'!. befor e or just "'fter the 
Federa l Court 1 s c1ecision. The construction industry, 1•Jhich will 
be discussed belm,tJ , more than other industries, would be mo st 
inclined to "give up~ 11 'He find tha t t wenty-seven p er c en t 
or thirty-four of the suspensions--wi thdx•awals t-.Jere in the 
construction industry . 
Arthur Goldberg , Genera l Counsel of the CI O, st f!. t ed: 2 
The ac tual number of inj unctions gr anted under 10 (1) 
t ell only part of the damag e which this rn•ovision itJorks 
on unions . . . • There is no way of knowing specifically 
how many unions agreed to settle these c a ses only because 
of the threat of an injunction a nd not because they agreed 
tha t the acts cha rged were illeg al per se, but t h ere must 
have been many. 
Labor has used thes e statistics to throw light on the 
inequity of the injunction provisions of the Taft-Hartl ey Act. 
It is di ff icult to come to any specific conclusions when re-
viewing s uch st a tistics without running the risk of ma...'l{ing 
v al ue judgments, but one Oan conclude tha t the threa t of in-
2 Senate Committee, QQ. Cit., p . 461. 
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junctions of any great length have a decided effect on union 
behavior once the threa t of an injunction become s manifest. 
CL·PTER VIII 
STATUS Q,UO 
Th e ma nda tory injunction should restore the "st a tus 
qv.o 11 ccorc1ing to the Courts, l abor writers ana. members of 
t h e National Labor Rel a tions Bo ard. The 11 st atus quo 11 is the 
situation tha t existed before the all eged unfair labor pra c-
tice b egan. 
_rank H. Blumenthal, Nationa l Labor Rel ations Bo a r·d 
st aff memb er, writes t hat 1.vhen a lleg ed. unf ~:1.ir l abor p r.?.ctic es 
hav e cea sed and no longer con stitute a threat to the 11 st a tus 
quo , 11 mandatory injunctions may be denied by the courts. 1 
!. ccording to Robert E. Segal, writing in the Ma ssa chu s e tt s 
Fed eration Reporter, the theory is tha t the matter in dis-
pute will rer.lain ._in 11 S'tatus quo " until the tri e.l. Ther efore, 
tri als a r e not helcl on the merit s of the orig inal disp ute s . 2 
Strikes a re usu ally determined vJithin a shol"'t time ; 
t h erefore , 11 the employer who is able to get a p r elimina r y in-
'? junction aga inst a strik e has usually 1-Jon the ba ttle. 110 
l·"r ank H. Bl umenthal , 111-iand.atory I njunctions ::md the 
NLRB, 11 Labor LavJ Journ al, Volwne I, No. 2 (Janua ry , 1951) 
p 0 8 . 
2Robert E. Segal, "Labor Presses Curb s on Federa l and 
St a te Injunctions, 11 11a ssachusetts Federation of L bor Reoorter , 
Vol . II, No.3 (l:larch, 1949) p . 3 . 
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Lone b efore the enactment of the U'ffiA and Section 10 
(1), v-rri t e r s h ad discussed the possible hardship such in-
junctions Hou l d work on unions. Fra.nYJ'urte r and Greene 
1-1rite that temporary injunctive relief "serves the important 
function of staying defendant's conduct regardless of the 
ultimate justifica tion of such restraint. 11 4 T'ney emphasized 
that issuance of the injunction makes the issue of final re-
lief a "practical nu llity, 11 for t he injunction cannot pre-
serve the "status quo." 
The suspension of activities affe cts only the stricken; 
the employer resumes his efforts to defeat the strike, 
snd resumes t h em free from the interdicted interferen ce. 
Moreover, the sus pension of strike activities, even 
t emporarily, may defe a t the strike for prac t ical purposes 
and foredoom its resurr.p t i on, even if t he injunc t ion is 
later lifted. Choice is not b et Heen irreparable damage 
to one side and compensable damage to the other. The 
law's conundrum is which side should bear t he risk of 
unavoidable irreparable damage. Improvident denial of 
the injunction may b e i r reparable to the compl ainant, 
i mprovident issue of the injunction may be irr eparable 
to the defendant.5 
Millis and Brov..rn state that the very purpos e of a s t rike 
is to ch ange a s i t u.'3. tion. · "If picketing, paying strike bene-
fit s , and apTJe aling to the public co uld be banned by a tem-
porary injunction issue d on t h e request of an emplo yer, t h en 
a s t rike could be crippled · before it could be effec t ive.n6 
4Frankfurter an d Greene, 
5Loc. Cit. 
OD e 
--
cit., 
6~1illis a..."1.d Brown, .£12.• cit., P• 35. 
P • 200. 
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They are of the opinion that once a strike is broken, the 
"spirit" of the ·workers is broken with it, and dismissal of" 
the injunction later would be useless t o the union. 
In the Carpent ers v. Sperry Case , the court rul ed that 
11 it is not the infle.xible duty of the court in every case of 
this kind (8bL~) to grant a temporary injunction to remain in 
force and effect until the Board makes its final adjudica-
n7 tion. • • • 
At the conclus i on of the t rial, the Court asked the 
attorney for the Board Hhen he thought the National Labor 
Relations Board vmuld make i t s final a d judication. The 
attorney indicated that a decision Hould be made about two 
months later . On the basis of t his statement, t h e injunction 
Has issued. After ten months had passed and no decision v.Jas 
forthcoming , the Court stated that if it lme"tv such a delay 
"tvould intervene , it Hould not have granted injunctive relief, 
or, at l ea s t, woulcl have 11 con ditioned the injunction differ-
ent ly. 11 
Although the courts no longer take t he pos sible length 
of inju..11.c t ions into cons ideration, i t is evident that there 
are those Hho seem to be a-,;vare of the effect t hat injunctions 
of any great leng th will have on a labor dispute. 
7 . 
Brotherhood of Carpente r s and Joiners of America, 
District Council of K. c., Ho., and Vicinity, AFL et al ., 
No • .50.5N reported in Labo r Rela tions Refe r ence Nanual , Volume 
No. 23, 11/1/48 to 4/30/~-9 (Washington : Bureau of ., .National 
Affairs, Inc., 1949) P • 20L~.5· 
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Senator Taft has stated that experience under the 
National Labor Re l ati ons Act has demonstrated that the Board 
is not able to a ct quickly enough in secondary boycott cases; 
so t hat substantial injury· r e sults . But Senator Taft made 
no ment ion of t he possible injury to unions v-.rhen injunctions 
are issued. 
In the follo>·Jing injunction cases , an attempt shall 
be made to p rove that the issuance of injunctions in case s 
under Section 10 (1) of the Act in providing for the re s toration 
of 11 status quo, 11 could be, or are injurious to labor organiza-
tions. 
I. CONSTRUCTI ON 
Is suance of an injunction on a construction project 
vJill 11 termina t e the dispute in t he employers favor, 11 provided 
that the case 1--rill not be heard wi thin a sho r t time by the 
National Labor Relations Board . 
In Barker v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and 
Joine r s, it was ruled tha t the Re gional Director of the National 
Labor Relations Board -vms entitled to a temporar•y injunction 
restraining a carpenter 's union from engaging in a strike. 8 
Fair Company, a retail department store in 1'1ontgomery, Alabama, 
8Barker etc., v. Local 1796, United Bro therhood of 
Carpenters and Joiners of ~~erica , AFL, No. 506N reported 
in 21LRRM 2J2.. Cit. p • 2~_06. 
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contracted "ri th Bear Brother s , Inc., to make alterations and 
improvements in the department store. A carpenter's union, 
which had tried to negotiate a closed shop contract Hith Fair 
Company, requested Fair to cease doing business l.·Jith Bear. 
Fair refused. TI-ro days after Bear began work on the project, 
t he ca r penters engaged in a strike a gainst Fair. Fair ap -
pealed to the Regi onal Director of · t h e National Labor Re lations 
Board l,rho in turn asked a Distr i ct Court for relief. 
The "Lmion face d t he folloHine problem: If the court 
issued an injunction t emporari ly stopping the strike so as 
to r e sto r e the "status quo" the union would effectively be 
prevented from taking any action which vJOuld disturb the 
"status quo." This 't·JOul d allow Bear Brothers to continue 
Horkine on the pro.j e ct; if no de cision He re made b y the Board 
unt il after the compl e tion of the altera ti ons and improvements 
in the s t ore , then the union ~rill have lost its f igh t 1.,ti th 
Fair Company. 
The injunction doe s not have the effect of holding 
everything in abeyance until the National Labor Relations · 
Board makes its decision--the union is eff ectively stopped--
the protagonists are allo1..Jed to carry on. The Court ruled 
as follows:9 
921LRRM Op . Cit., PP • 2408-2409. 
Orde red , a d j u dged and decreed, that respondent, Local 
1796, Uni t ed Brotherho od of Carp enters and Joiner s of 
America, AFL, its a ge nts, servants, employees and all 
per s ons in active con cert or participation Hith it, 
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be and they are hereby restra ined a nd enj oined, p ending 
the f inal adjudication o f this matter by the NLRB from 
engaging in, or inducing or e n courag ing the ~n~loyees 
of Montgomery Fair Company, Nontgomery, Alabama , by 
o r ders , di r ec t ions , ins tructi ons, thr•eats , p r-omi s e of 
b e n ·sfits, dis c i:J linai'y or pu..ni tive a ction a gainst 
membeT'S of -the Pespondent , or picke ting at o r near 
the Fiontgomery Sto::'e o f Hontg omery Fair Co., or an y 
oth er lik e or r e l ate d acts O J ' conduct, Ol" by perrnitting 
any s u.ch to remain in effe c t , t o en e;age in, a strike 
or a conc erted refusal in t he course of t heir employ-
men t to perform any se r vice s, in o rde r t o f orce or l'' e -
quire Hontgomery Fair Company, to c ease doing business 
·v.ri t h Bear Bros., Inc., o r· any other p ers on. • • • 
~Qe injunction was issued on Febi'u a ry 17, 1948. On 
Har ch 18 , 19~-9, approximatel~' th.-t r teen months l ater, a de-
ci sion Has rendere d by t h e National Labo r Re l at i ons Board. 10 
\vork Has begun on the p roject on July 7, 1947. · One can 
assume the vJ'Ork Has completed before the Nat iona l Labor 
Re lat ions Board de cis i on. Therefore , any s ubsequent de-
ci s ions vmuld h ave been of little imp or tance to t h e emp loyer'. 
The injunction 1·Tas al l that ·Has n e e ded to defea t the lmion in 
this instance. 
Host di spu tes on con struction pr ojects follo".v the 
sa."'ne pat tern as in t he pr e vio us case . For example, Ro ane-
Anderson Company 1.-ras a contrac t or Hith the Atomic Ener gy 
10T.he Board rule d tha t the union had violated the p ro-
visions of Section 8 (b)(4)A. 
8l 
C . i 11 Oilli'"llSS on. On July 1, 1948, the Atomic Energy Commission 
o rdered Roane-Anderson to let a subcontract for rep lacing 
lighting fixtures at a school building in Oak Ridge , Tennessee. 
Bids v.rere accepted, and the contract vms a-vmrded to Kiser 
Electric Company , the lovJest bidder. Kiser began -vwrking on 
the project about July 23, 1948, employing nonunion electri-
cians. On July 29, 1948, maintenance electricians, linemen 
and trouble men v.rho are members of local 760 em:p loyed by Roane-
Anderson i n the maintenance o:f electrica l :facilities, left 
their jobs. 
Previously, the union agent had requested his emp loyer 
not to hire nonunion men. On August 31, 19L~8, an injunction 
vias issued a gainst Local 760. I t w.as n'o.t until l'lfay 11, 1949, 
tha t the National Labor Relations Boar d gave its decision. 
The injunction preserved t he 11 status quo 11 , that is, 
allowinc t he nonunion ·v-rorkers to continue work on the pro j ect. 
The injunction vms in e.ffe ct ei ght and one-half months and 
during this period 1>Jo r k continued. This delay in giving de-
cisions has caused some to classify these National Labor Rela-
tions Board decis i ons as merely uacademic 11 12 in view o:f the 
11 Styles, etc. v. Local 760, Inte rna tional Bro ther hood 
o:f Electr ical Workers, AFL No. 1152, reported in Labor Rela-
tions Reference }1anual, Vol. No. 22, 5/1/48 to l073f7Ii:8--
(Washington: Bureau o:f National Af fa i r s, Inc., 1949>" p. 2446. 
12
sena te Comrrd ttee, 212.• Cit., p . 461. 
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fact that a l·ter decision has no particular meaning to the 
union involv ed. 
To summarize, t he injunction enables t he employer to 
carry on without any interference from the union, until, a t 
least,the National Labor Relnt ion s Board makes a decision . 
If the employer is able to finish the business the union V<Ja s 
' opposed to or prevent the union from t aking action for ·n 
ext ended period of time in a labor dispute, in many ca ses a 
decision for the union has no meaning . A good ill ustration 
of the l a tter occurred in the Ryan Construction Corporation 
Case . 13 
An elect ric "VJorkers local had a dispute vJi th the Bucyrus 
Company , the local's employer. They went on strike because 
the Bucyrus Comp any did not 'llJ ish to grant a wage increase . 
The Local picketed the main gate of the Bucyrus Comp any . The 
Ryan Construction Company i-vas, a t this time, expanding the 
f acilities of the Bucyrus Company. Because the Construction 
Compa_ny workers used the gate which the local vJas picketing, 
an injunction was is sued against the local's a ctivities. The 
de.t e of issuance Wets _ ugust 27 , 1948. On July 28, 1949, the 
l\Tational Labor Relations Boe.rd l''uled that the local had not 
been engaged in a secondary boy cott. But this decision had 
lit t l e meaning to the union. The injunction had prevented 
13
senate Committee, QQ. Cit ., Part 4, April 22 , 23, 24, . 
27 , 28 , 29 , and 30, 1953, pp . 1991-1992 . 
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the local from taking action to effect a wage increase. If 
in August, 1948, the local vras carrying on an annual Hage 
bargain, then the injunction served as a me ans enabling t he 
employer not to grant a 1-vage increas e for approxLrnately t1vo 
years. 
One fuxther problem must be studied in regard to dis-
putes on construction project s . 
Booker Lumber Company was a cor pora tion enga ged in the 
processing and sale of lumber. 1~- It Has located in Syracuse, 
New Yo r k and was enga ged in interstate cornne r ce. Itsam~loyees 
-vmre not members of a union. Gress ani Cont ractors, Inc., 1vas 
a general cont r a cting corpora tion. The car penter's employed 
by i t were union members. 
In t he sum:J:ner of 1953, Gre ssani vms engaged in the con-
stru c t ion of a bui ~ding at the Sta te Fair grounds near Syracuse. 
Seve ral of Gre ssan:!Ls men r ef used to 1-vork on Booker's nonunion 
pro ducts 1..rhich 1.-vere b eing used at the site. As a result, an 
injunc t ion wa s issued a gains t the union for fo r cing t heir em-
ployer to ceas e doing business 1...ri th Booker. The union was, 
t hen, forced to use the nonunion products. 
14Irving , etc. v. United Bro t h er hood of Carpenters and 
Joiner s of A..merica, Local Union no. 12, AFL, No. 4916 reported 
in Labor Re lations Refe r ence Hanual, Volume No. 33, 11/1/53 to 
4/30/54 (Washington: Bureau of National Aff airs, Inc., 1954) 
P • 2056. 
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A similar situa t ion occurred in Douds v. Sheet Metal 
vlorkers but vli th entirely di.f.ferent results .15 Die rks was 
in the business o.f insta lling heating and v entillating systems 
in public buildings. The union involved was t he r epresenta-
tive o.f the sheet metal em.ployees o.f Dierks and other members 
o.f a New York City Heating, Pi ping and Air-Conditioning Con-
tractors Associa t ion. 
For s everal years Dierks and other h0ating contra ctors, 
members of the associa tion, purchas e d radiator enclosures on 
special order .from Ferr o Company and other manu.facturers. 
Th ese manu.f a cturers did not b elonG to the employer's associa-
tion nor did they employ union members o.f the r espondent. 
On or about June 22, 1951, the union indu ced the em-
ployee s o.f Di erks and other members of the associ a tion to en-
gage in a refusal t o use t he product s o.f Ferr o Company and 
other mr.,nu.facturers of radi a tor enclosur es who did not employ 
members o.f the union. Becaus e o.f t his, Ferro Company .filed a 
charg e Hi t h t he National Labor Re l ations Board, alleging that 
the union wa s involved in a secondar y boycott. 
It is i mportant to note the similar ities in this case 
and in the CaPpenters ca se. The CarpentePs Hent on strike to 
.force their employers to ceas e doing bus ine ss t.ri t h nonunion 
l5Douds v. Sheet 11e tal WorkePs Union, Local Union No. 
28, No. 12093 reuorted in Labor Rel ati ons Re.fe r ence Manual, 
Vol. No. 29, 11(1/51 to 4/30/52 {Washington: Bureau o.f Nationa l 
A.f.fai r s, Inc., 1952) PP• 2084-2089. 
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p roducers; t he sheet metal workers went on strik e to force 
their employers to cease doing business with nonunion p ro-
ducers. In both cases applications for injunction \vere 
filed, but the similarities end at this point. An injunction 
wa s issued in the Carpenters case . In the She et Hetal \vorkers 
case the District Court ruled as fo llows :l6 
... the evidence establishes that if any labor dispute 
existed, it was between the respondent and Dierk s •••• 
If these facts indi ca te that the respondent's act ion 
constitute a seconda.ry boycott, Di er ks must be regarded 
a s the "Secondary 11 employer. The responde nt 1 s co ncerted 
action directed against Dierks, with the object ••• of 
forcing Dierks to cease doing business with Ferro, must 
likewise be regarded as having the purpose of inducing a 
settlement of a labor dispute between the respondent and 
Ferro . 
Thus the circumst ances shown to exist here fail to f it 
the case within the framework of the traditional concept 
of a ·s econdary boycott . 
For th~ foregoing rea sons, therefore , the p etition for 
injunctive relief is denied. 
This comparison is important in that most disputes on 
construction projects occur bec ause of the app earance of 
nonunion workers or nonunion goo ds . The only difference in 
the principles of the preceding two cases are t hat contra cting 
firms, faced with a strike by their .employees , indirectly harm 
t hei r' employ ers' projects (the contractors'). Both contract 
a·warders are hurt by delays, but on construction projects, 
p er se, a dispute only a rises when work is in progress--this 
16 I b id. , p . 2089. 
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need not happ en .· in other cases. If the ruling in the sheet 
metal case could be applied to sir:nilar disputes in the con-
struction industry then the use of the injunction in such 
disput es woul d b e elimina ted entirely. 
To reiterate, unionized construction worker s are 
handicapp ed b ecause of Section 10 (1) of the Labor Hanag e-
ment Rela tions Act . They are handicapped because issuance 
of an injunction enables employers to carry on activities 
which l abor organizations are oppo sed to -~ . The 11 status quo 11 
is preserved--the union cannot act . 
Issuance of the injunction to preserve t he 11 status quo 11 
is not restricted to the construction industry, ho wever. The 
following ca ses illus trate this contention. 
II. OTHER TH~~ CONSTRUCTION 
It can be shown that t he mandatory injunction has a 
·similar · effect out side of the construction indu stry, however·. 
The follo'iving ca ses a re cit ed as examples of this phenomenon. 
Local 1175 of the Confectionary and Tobacco Jobbers 
Emp l oyees Union, installed and serviced cigarette vending 
machines for its employers. 17 The union members were compen-
17Douds etc., v. Confectionary e:111d Tobacco J obbers 
E~ployees Union, Loca l 1175 et al, reported in L bor Rela-
tions Reference Nanual, Vol. No. 24, 5/1/49 to 10/ 31/ 49 
( Wa shington: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1949), 
p . 2120. 
'a? 
sated in part, on the vol"Lli!le of cigarettes sold through the 
machines. A nevJ employer, lJho 1.-ms not an employer of union 
men, v.ras repl a cing the ma chines of union employers in all the 
taverns in a certain district. The union picketed the taverns 
and attempted to induce employees of the taverns a s 'l...rell as 
tave r-n suppliers, to force the tave r n ope r a tors to ce a se doing 
bu siness 1-dth t he new vending machine oper ato i' • If the union 
Has not succe s sful in doing so, it would mean a substantial 
loss in earning s .for the 1..mion membe r s. 
}funtoya, VJho Has the ne'lrJ employer, appealed to the 
regional director of the National Labor Relations Board. An 
injunction 1-ras issued on Hay 25, 1949. On July 29, 1949, the 
injunction ·Has wi t hdrmm after the dis1JUt e 1....ras settled. As a 
result, the National Labor Rel a tions Board proceedings He r e 
discontinued. The manner in v-rhich the di s~Jute was settled 
1....ras not available. However, if an injunction Has not issued, 
one can assume that the union a ctivi t y Hould hs.ve continued, 
until, at l ea s t, the union Hon itspoint or admitted defeat. 
But issuance of the injunction, r estoring the 11 status quo, 11 
prev ented the union from taking any action. Faced i·Ii th the 
possibility of (1) losing a s ubs t anti al part of its earnings 
before the decision of the National Labor Re l ations Board, and 
(2), Montoya se r vicing more taverns in the interim, t he "Lmion 
mi ght have decided tha t the best course of action Hould be an 
attemp t at "ironing -out" the problem Hith. all the parties con-
cerned. 
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If the union re a soned in this manner, then one ca n say 
that the injunction and the possibility of a belated decision 
on the p art of the Na tional Labor· Relations Board, for c e d t h e 
un ion to g ive in. 
A similar ca se occurred in 1953 when ~ local of t he 
Foo d Processors, Pa ckers, \·larehous emen and Clerical employees, 
p icketed retail stores.l8 The union attempted to induce store 
emp loyees to r efuse to h andle products manuf actured by "' co n-
diment p c;.cking company with which the uni on ha d a cU spute. 
The injunction wa s issu ed o n May 18, 1953. App ro xi-
mately three months lat er, the cas-e 'i'll a S wi thdr avm. Possib l y 
the union vJas aware that the injunction could l a st for s everal 
months more an d tha t a nonviolation decision at tha t l a t el'' d, te 
would b e of no ava il. 19 
The p receding c as es a r e rep res ent a tive of t he manner 
i n vJh ich t he mandatory injunction s work in ca ses oth er• tha n 
in th e construction industry. Throughout this discussion, 
c a se s a nd situa tion s h a ve been p r esented which illustre.t e 
p robl ems co nnecte with su sp ec ted viola tion of Section 8 ( b ) ( 4 )A 
18LeBaron etc. , v. Foo d Processors, Pa ckers , ;t arehousemen , 
a nd Clerice.l Employe e s, Loca l No~- 547, et a l report e~ i n LRRM 
Vol. No. 3 2, 5/1/53 to 10/31/53 ( Washington : Bureau of Nationa l 
Aff a irs, 19 53) p . 2284 . 
19In Douds etc., v . Loca l 294, Teamst ers etc., a n in-junction "1as i .ssu.ed on J anua l''Y 2, 1948. On Decemb er 1 6 , 19 49 , 
t h e NLRB r uled tha t the union h a d not viola ted the Act. mhe 
injunction h ad r emained in effect fo r almost t wo y ea r s . 
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of the Act. 
It is our contention that Se ction 8 · (b) ( 4) subsections 
B and C are not aff E~ cted by the Horldngs of the mandatory in-
junction. 
III. NONAPPLICABILITY OF STATUS QUO 
Up to this point, the contention of this paper has been 
tha t issuance of an injunction termina tes labor dis:9ute s in 
the employer r s favo r by preventinr:~ the union from t aking any 
action and by posing t he threa t of an injunction of ex tended 
duration. This can be p roved t o be true a s long as the 1 abor 
dis pute involves a pos s ible vi olation of Section 8 (b)(4)A of 
the Taft- Hart l ey Act , but, mandatory injunctions will not 
"terminate th.e dispute" in the employer's favor Hhen issued 
be cause of possi_ble vi olat:ton of Section 8 (b)( 4 ), sub-
sections B and c. Th.e follovl:lng case is cited t o prove this 
contention: 
In Yage r v. the Internati cnal Union of Opera t ing En-
g ineers, Local 12, t h e local t rh;d, b y :picke ting a rrl other 
cor:d uct, to induce employees of the secondar y emplo yer to re-
fuse to work Hith empl oyees o i' the primary employer.20 The 
20yager , etc., v. International Union of Oper a ting 
Engineers, Loca l Union No . 12, r eported in Labo r Re lations 
Reference Manual Vol. 36, 5/l/53 t o 10/31/55 (Washington: 
Bureau oi' National Afi'ai rs 1955 ), P• 2552. 
local also tried to induce t he employees of secondary employers 
not to vJ'Ork on any of Cr ook and Shepherd's p roducts, being the 
primary employer. The objective of the union \-1Tas to force 
Crook and Sh epherd to recognize and bargain with the union 
although the union had not b 8en certified as the repre s entative 
of such employees in a.ccordance "tvi th the Na t ional Labor Rela-
tions Act. An injunction wa s i s sued for possible viola tion of 
Sec t ion8 (b)(4)B. 
The injunction, a s in all t he case s, r estored the nstatus 
quo." Under 8 (b)(4)A case s it was sh oL--m that injunctions (1) 
allowed t he employe r to f inish projects vJ"hich a u...."lion had a 
dispute over , ( 2) fo r ced the ·Horkers to use nonunion pro ducts 
on a construction job, (3) a l lm-.red the emplo ye r to avoi d the 
consequences of nona greement in t h e bargaining procedure , and 
(4) possibly forced t he Q~ion to give in or make con cessi ons. 
But mandatory injunctions issued under 8 (b)(4)B do not have 
these effects . 
A dispute arises uncler 8 (b) (4)A because the union 
repr esen t ing the workers cannot Hork out a problem ~·ri th the 
primary employer. And it has be en sh Ql.·.rn tha t t he mand a t ory 
injunction ac ts in such a way a s t o make later decis :J ons of 
the National Labor Relations Boa rd unimportant to the parties 
involved fD. t he dis:r.,u te . But such is no t t he case under 
8 (b) (LdB. A. union a t temptin;s t o gain repr c s en t a t ion of the 
employees of a firm has nothing to lo s e . The injunction pre-
vents t h e union from attempts at organization until the 
National Labor Re lations Board rules . There is no imr:1ediacy 
to the situation; the r e is no barg aining problem invo lved 
Hhich delay in solving Hill hurt the vmrkers. This is also 
true in 8 (b)( 4 )C cas e s in Hh ich a m1.ion a tte:mp -G s , thrm .. :tgh 
the use or secondary a ction, to force the primary employers 
to recognize it as the rep resentativ e of his e mplo yees Hhen 
another union has already been c ertified a s s n ch. 
In this chap ter , an atte:m.p t has been made to p r ove 
that manda tory injunc t ions , issued for p os sibl e violation 
oi' .Se c t ion 8 (b)(I~_ ) A , defeat unions. The durati on of in-
junctions 1,ras s h oW11. to be of ~)rime imJ:)Ortance in 11 termina t ing 
the dispute 11 in favor of the emp loyer. Labor organizations 
contend that the restoration of the 11 status quoH is another 
me ans by 1;·.Jhich they are defeated . But not ye t mentioned is 
L :tbor 's cri t icism of the General Counsel. They state that 
i t is he who decided v-rhether in junc t i on p roce edings shall be 
initia ted in a Federal Distri c t Court, 1vho reall y holds the 
p ov.rer in injunction p roceedings. 
CHi\PTER IX 
THE GENERAL COUNSEL 
Beside l s.bor 1 s prima ry criticism tha t the TP..ft-Hartley 
Act r estores 11 governrnent by injunction 11 labor chs nn el s most 
o f its criticism a t the injunction p r-oceedings, an d especially , 
a t the Genera l Counsel of the Nat iona l La or Rela tion s Board. 
It is he who p l ay s the 11 vill a inous role 11 in injun ction 
pr-oceedings ; it is he who decides fir-st 1r.1hether the p etitioner ' s 
cla i m is valid; it is he who requests t he injunction. The 
Genera l Counsel h a s the U. S. Government behind him ; he has 
the public behind him. 
Thes e st a temen ts ar r~ l..,ep resent a tive of th e type of 
criticism 1 evi ed a t the Gener a.l Couns:el. T i:J O of the most 
well-known critics of the Genernl Couns el a r e U. S. Senator 
Huber-t Humphr ey fro m the Sta te of Minnesot a , a nd Arthur 
C~ldberg, former counsel of the CIO. 
Sens.tor Humphrey cla i ms tl at t he pow er of the General 
Counsel is very great. 1 
The chances a re better tha n three to one that if 
the Gener al Couns el petitions the District Court for 
an injunction under 10 (1) the i n junctio n will be 
gr anted. This is , after all a petition with the 
great prest i ge of the Government behind. it . 
l s ena te Co mmit tee , QQ. Ci t., p . 510 . 
He further s tates that the National Labor Relations 
Boa rd has reversed the General Cm .. msel in "37% of the cases 
involving an 8 (b )(4) complaint . 11 
f.'Ir. Goldberg's vi etm are n o t w1.like Senat or Humphrey's 
for he states that--2 
Se ction 10 (j) and 10 (l) amount to an extraordinary 
grant of authority to one man , the Gene r al Counsel ~ 
to petition for inj~mctive r elief. It has been said 
in sup}::·ort of t his provi sion that 'raft-Hartley does 
not authorize private parti es t o obtain an injunction 
against an unfair l a bor practice. We gain little 
solace fr om this fact inasmuch as General Counsel 
acts in the interest of priva te parties in obtaining 
injunctive relief a gainst unions. The General Counsel 
is f ree to cloak himself -vTith the enormous presti ge of 
the United State s Government in seeking an injunction, 
on the basis of little or no evidence. The ~eneral 
Counsel is tho sole jude e of vJhetheP the r e is Peason-
able cause t o believe tha t the unfair practi ce charge s 
u...rJ.dePlying the demand fop inj~mctive relief is true •• • • 
And in support of thi s contention, t1r . Goldberg presents 
the stock ~ase used in proving the ineptness of the General 
Counsel. This concerned the Kern Co~mty Farm Labor Union, an 
.A.FL affiliate. 3 The union had sought t o barga in Hi th the Di 
- Giorgia Company, a faPming enterprise in California. The 
company refused to bargain, and tv:hen the union brought unfair 
labor practice charges against DiGiorgia, the General Counsel 
ruled that agricultural employees are exempt from the Taft-
Hartley Act . La te r t he company filed secondary boycott charges 
2 Ibid., P• ~.61. 
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a Gainst the union and the General Colli~sel authorized the 
issuance of an injunction a gains t the union. The injunction 
"tvas issued. 
A trial examiner heard the case and issu ed an int er-
mediate re po r t in which he cbarac terized the arguments of the 
General Counsel as 11 a ser ies of int e r pretations so far fetched 
and forced as to b r ing into question the cando r of Congre ss 
as Hell as the integrity of the interpretative process. 11 
It has been said that the union involved in injunction 
litigation is at a decided disadvantag e. The union is o pposed 
by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, 
a man who is a repre s entative of the u. S. Government. 
Woodruff Randolph a pp oaring before the comr.u t tee on 
Taft-Hartley Revis i ons in 1953 stated:4 
Goverrunent action on behalf of emp loyers is, if anything , 
·Ho r se than rlirec t employer action; it bring s to the sup -
port o f t he emp loye I' the massive pre stig e of the U. s. 
Governrnent, save s hL~ considerable costs of litigation, 
and allows h im p iously to hide behind a screen of "public 
interes t." 
We have found that sixty-five per cent of the Federal 
District Courts' decisi ons h a ve b e en for the issuance of an 
injunction. All the p r oof that is needed is "prima facie 11 
e vidence tha t there has b een a v 5. olation of Section 8 (b) (4) 
s ubsec t ions A, B, c, of- the Act. Adding this to the f acts 
that the General Counsel is a government represen t a tive 1·.ri th 
4Senate Comrni ttee, 2£• Cit., p. 620. · 
95 
enormous presti ge and that the district court "does not decide 
~vhich litigant is to ultima tely prevail, n5 the percentage of' 
injunctions issued is pos s ibly explained. For if the General 
Counsel h a s reason to beli eve that the employer's claim is 
valid , he "t~ill bring the case to a Fe de Pal District Court. 
And more often than not, an injunction '!:Jill be issued. 
This has caused the union to attack the provis i on of 
th8 Labor }1anagement Re l ati ons Act, giving the General Counsel 
the sole povmr of deci ding which cas es sha ll be b r ought before 
t he Courts. The criticism has some va lidity. 
Robert B. Watts, in behalf' of' the Aircraft and Indus-
tries As sociation, summed management's vi eHs on t he Section 
v.rhen he stated that the mandatory injunction acts as a "very 
re a l de ter rent to illegal ac t ion" on the part of' unions.6 
Nos t Hould agree Hi th Mr . 1'1fatts, but Hhat is overlooked is 
the damage t hat the injunc t ion does to the union. 
5 - . 
Blumenthal, 2E.• Clt., P • 8. 
6 
Sena te Cornmi ttee, Part 2 .9..E.• Cit., p . 724 . 
CHAPTER X 
Sffi1NA.RY AND CONCLUSIONS ON SE CTION 10 (1) 
The s u ccess of a labo r organization involved in a dis-
pute over the secondary boycott provis i ons of the LNRA, varies 
inver sely ·Hi th the length of t he injuncti on issued. The in-
junction, by resto r ing tho 11 status quo, 11 bring s about t his 
end. This Has shm-m t o be true for mandatory injunctions 
issued for suspec t ed viol a tion of Section 8 (b)(4)A by the 
cons truc t ion industry as well as t h os e l abo r or ganizations 
outside of the construction industry . Issuance of a manda-
tory injunction for possibl e violation of sv.bsections B and 
C of the Act, unlike subsection A, does not "te rmina te the 
dispute in the employer's f avor. 11 The union has no t hing to 
lose b y delays, there is no im.mediate pr oblem to solve, etc. 
The duration of the injunc t ion ·Has sha.r n t o be of 
p rime im~J ortance in 11 termina t in;; the di spute 11 in favor of 
the employer. Substantiation involved analyses of the amount 
of in j unctions, their dur a tion, t he amount of 1·Jithdr aHals and 
susp ens i ons , e t c. 
It Has s h oTrm tha t the Gen er al Couns el, b y having the 
sole p o1.-rer to bring cas e s before the Cou.rts, and by doing s o , 
could be considered t h e prima ry instrumen t used in defe atin g 
t he un i on in such cases. 
Possibly the bes t solution t o t he problem has been 
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s·uggested by Albert .J. Fitzgerald, General President, United 
El e ctrical, Radio, and Ha ch ine \.J'orkers of America. He stated 
that t here 1-·Jas a far better and more equitable remedy avail-
able to deal Hith unfai r l abor practices.1 
This can be done by authorizing the NLRB to expedite 
the he a ring of any case 1r!here it beli eves particular 
damage is thre a tened to the part y 1-.rho has filed 
charg es. If, after a Board dec i sion, the gui lty 
party refuses to desist from i l legal acti ons, the 
Board may then, if neces s a r y, apply to the courts 
for relief •••• Unde r this procedure the court 
o r der Hould be issued afte r, and n ot before, full 
examination of all the f a cts and a faii' h earing . 
President Eisenho-vrer has als o s ugg e s t e d such a p lan. 
He has ~J roposed that the National Labor Re lat;:L ons Board be 
given dis creti on to de termine Hhe ther the boycott affects 
the public enough to 1rmrrant an injunc t ion. It p robably 
Hould tak e lon.:J;er to ge t the o r der than 1.mde r present p ro-
ce dure. 
I t would seem t hat SlJ.ch a remedy would be acco~J table 
to both labo l" anc_ manae;ement . If parti cula r da:ti18_ge is 
threa t ened, the :National Labor Re l ation s Board Hould i TIJJiledi-
ately h ear the case , thus saving t r1e employer f r om the effects 
of any a ction on the part o f the emp loyees. On the other hand 
l a bor -vwuld not be faced Hi th long delays before the h earing 
of the Nati onal Labor Re l at ions Board and the "status quo" 
p roblem u ou ld be done a '".:Jay 1-.ri th. 
1
s e n 9.te Committee, Part 4-, 2£.• Cit., pp . 1991-1992. 
CH !.PT J:1 XI . . 
SUHI.:JL{Y AND CONCLUSION 
Fro m t he l a tt er p art of the ninete enth cent u r y up to 
t he pres ent, s eco ndary boycott s e.nd l abor i njunctio ns h o.ve 
b e en alternately a ccep t (::. d anc1 rejecteo. by the Federal Govern-
ment. The Shel"'ma n Act p rohibited combinat ions in r estra i nt 
of int erst ate commerc e but made no sp ecific r efer en ce t o 
l a o r unions or l abor disputes. But the United Sta tes 
Supr eme Court ruled in s evel"al cases t hat l abor unions '!:J er e 
s ub j ect t o p r o s ecu.tion under t h e .-~. ct . 
Th e l ayton Act cont cdned a numb er of favorF.l. }l e p r o-
v i s i ons app licnb l e t o organized larJor, bu t in 19 21 the 
.Sup r erae ourt h el d tha t the boycott of nonunion ma t eri al s 
in i nt erst~te commerce by unions could still be enj oined . 
_.eginning l:J i t h t h e dep r ession , ther e wa s a mar k ed 
chang e in the a ttitude of the government . The Norr is-La 
Gua r di e. t~nti-Injunction ..: ct a nd. t h en t he ivagner Act followect 
i n r apid s ucces sion. 
Allegedly , Labor ~·Jith its ne~J found power b eg8n t o abus e it. 
ft er World \'Jar II, the p ublic becerue 11 strike consciou s , 11 
and wh en a Republican Congres s wa s elected, the Labor-Han F.lg e-
ment Relat i ons Act wa s p ass ed . 'rhe purpo s e of the Act 't'l1a s to 
regul a te unions. Second0ry boycot t s tv er e made illegol; manda-
tory injunctions were p rovided for. 
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It v.ras the thesis of this p aper that the secondary boy-
cot t p rovision of the Act protects t he secondary emp loyer but 
that the mandatory injunction provision in e;ivin g the secondary 
emr) loyer t empora ry protec t ion predetermine s the outcome of the 
disp ute. As a result, both sections effectively weaken the 
poHe r of l abor. 
I,abor chal lenged the constitu tionality of Section 8 
(b) U:.) A on the grolmds that it conflic t ed Hi th free speech 
and p ro t e ction from involunt ary s e rvitude. Both contentions 
1rrere rej e c ted by the Supi'eme Court , t hus es tablishing the 
legality of t h e provision. 
It 1:r.ras found tha t both t he National Labor Relations 
Board an d the courts rule to protect nne u trals 11 in indus-
trial disputes Hhen a secondary bo ycott is evident. A prob-
lem Has incurr ed in provinG the existence of 'the boyco t t, 
for there Here questi ons as t o the eff ects of p rimary a ction, 
Hho primary employer s are , the situ s of dispute, etc. 
First there Here · s i t uati ons in vJh ich a dis p u t e betl;--Jeen 
the primary employe r and h is emp loye es had the effect of a 
boycott, tha t is, put t ing economi c p ress"Lu'e on t r.drd p arties . 
Th.e Board endeavored to balance the intent to outlaVJ sec-
on :~ary b oyco t ts and the int ent to p reserve laHfu l pT'imary 
me ans . In doing s o, a dispute b e tvmen ~) :-cimary emp loyers and 
employees , although affecting t h ird p arties , was de emed t o b e 
la1;,rful. Th.us an imp ortant qualification of the intent of 
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Congress became evident--the 11 other 11 employer is not alHays 
protect ed. 
Secondly, there 1..rere situa tions in ·Hhich determina tion 
as to Hhether or not 8 (b)(4)A had b een violated h ing ed on 
the status of the 11 other 11 employer. If the "other" employe r 
is r e l s.ted to t he primary emp loyer through joint o-vmership 
or control, then he is not t ermed a "neutral 11 and is not p ro-
tected by the lai·J" . The union is allmJed to boycott the "other" 
emp loyer . 
Thi rdly, there were s i t u ations in vlhich it Has ne cessary 
to det e rmine v-rhether the dispute occur red at the site Hhei'e 
the employer's "normal" business is carried on. If s e veral 
emp l oyer.s Ho r ked at the same site , and if the striking L.mion's 
emp loyer I·J"a f3 engaged in his "normaltt business at the site, and 
the union states tha t its dispute is solel y l·li th the primary 
employer , then the se condary bo ;y-cott p rovi sion wo uld not 
apply. The se cond distinction concerned bus ines ses Hhi ch 
have a r oving situs . I t ·Has r u led t hat prima ry emplo;,.-ers 
can picket the ir emplo;y-er 1 s premise s as wel l as h is roving 
situ s a s long as there is no c oncerted activi ty to make sec-
onc::.a ry e li1)lo~rees str ike. In both of those distinc t i ons, it 
should be no t ed tha t e conomic p i'essure is di r e cte d at the 
p rimary emp loyer; t he secondary emp loye r is p r otected. 
The fourth s i t uation v.ras t he extent to Hhich t he term 
"unfair" Hould be us ed and whether a union could refuse to 
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'\rJOrk on 11 unfair 11 goods. The Board ruled. in the former that 
the "internal listing 11 of the primary em)loyer is l a'i'!]ful, 
but conv ey ing that information to a 11 second.Dl'"'Y emp loyer 1 s 
II 
employe e is illegal. In the l atter case, a question exists 
a s to the legality of refusing to work on nonunion goods. As 
was illustr•ated, the co t.n"ts have hanc1ed down conflicting de-
cisions. 
Once the above problems are VJOrked out, p rotection of 
the third party is guaranteed. This guar ente e of p rotection 
me"lls that the boycott device is lost to organized. labor. 
The framers of the Law , desiring to prevent a.ny damage 
:f\rom secondary p ressure, provided for manda tory injunctions 
in case of 11prima f a cie 11 • vtola tlon of Section 8 (b ) ( 4·) . This 
'ivas done so as to p revent 11 irrepa.rable 11 damag e which could 
occur before the Natione.l Labor Relations Bo ard decision. 
Part of the thesis of this paper \v a s tha t the success of a 
un ion in a boycott ca se i.vhich involves an injunction, v a ries 
inversely with the length of the injunction. 
An examination of the injunction st a tistic s reve a l ed 
t hat injunctions are usua lly in effect e.bout seven month s. 
No specific conclusions could be cl.rav-m from these st3.tistics, 
but one could not escape the conjecture t hat many unions 
agree to settle c a ses because of the injunction or threa.t of 
one . 
It was shown that restoration of the "sta tus quo " allows 
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emp loyers to carr y on activities l abor is opposed to, and 
allo't-JS employers to escape, in some ins tances, the cons e-
quences of nonagreement in a dispute. 
The section provides fo r t he Genera l Counsel to 
netition a Federal Distr i ct Court for in j unctive r s lief. 
I t ·Has s hown that t he Genera l Counsel, by having the s ole 
poHe r t o bring case s befo 1•e the Courts, could be cons i dered 
one of the primary instr~ment s in defe a ting a union. 
When Slli~ng up , it be comes evident that the mandato ry 
injunction is a l l t hat is ne eded to defeat the union in most 
cases, t he decis i on of the National Labor Relat i cns Board 
being "merely acadern.ic. 11 
Several problems have been r a ised in this examinat ion, 
p roblems to "L-Jhi ch no one has ye t f ou_nd an a.ns~..Jer. 
For example, the recent decision on 11 hot c argo" clauses 
create d questions which have been left unanswered. Will em-
ployer s Hho are forced to a ccep t such clauses los e the pro-
tection of Section 8 (b)( 4 )A? If Douds v. Sheet Hetal 1-Jorkers 
is t aken as the criterion, t he ans v.rer Hill b e yes. If the 
NLRB v. Shingle vJeavers or Irving v. Carpenters is taken as 
the cr i terion, the ansHer will be no. The decisions in 
t hese cas e s can only lead one to believe t hat set standards 
in such cas e s are lacking . 
Statements by President Eisenhower and o thers on 
differentiati ne; se condary bo ycotts and res ti'icting the use 
I03. 
of the labor injunction have raised doubts as to the equity 
of Sections 8 (b) (~_)A and 10 (1). Since the Sherman Act , 
the philosophy to·Hards seconda ry boycott s and the labor in-
jvnction has run full circle . Under the She r:man Act the 
secon da:!'y boy.cott ·t-ras condenmed and the labor injunction 
r,..m s frequently used. Over time, secondary boycotts have 
been permi tted and labor injunc t ions hav e be en restrict e d. 
Today the Taft - Har tley Act bring s us b a ck to the situation 
tha t existed unde r t h e Sherman Act--condenmation of the sec-
onda ry boycott and fre quen t use of t h e labo r injunct ion. 
V.fi1ether the sugge stions for arn.enJ. ing the Labor Han:-te;ement 
Re lations Act are he eded, remains to be seen. 
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APPENDIX A 
PUBLIC I..Avl 101 80th CON GRESS 
CHAPTER 120 lst SESSION: 
"LABOR :VJANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947" 
SECTION 8 
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(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organ-
ization or its a gents ("4)to engage in, or to induce or en-
courage the employees of any employer to enga ge in a , strike 
or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to 
use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle 
or 1.1ork on any goods, articles, materials, or cornmodi ties 
or tq perform any services, where an object thereof is: 
(A)forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed 
person to join any labor or employ er organization or any 
employer or other per son to cease using, selling, handling , 
transporting, or othe~rise dealing in the products of any 
other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease 
doing business with any other person; 
(B)forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize 
or barga i n i'Tith a labor organization as the representative 
of his employees unle e.s such labor organization has been 
c ertified as the representative of such employees under 
the nrovisions of sec t ion 9: 
(C) forcing or r equiring any employer to recognize or bargain 
"Vvith e. particular le.bor organi7..ation as the representative 
of his employees if another labor organi zation has been 
cer t ified as t he r epre s entat i ve of such employees .nder the 
prov ision of section 9: 
(D)forcing or r equiring any employer to ass ign particular 
u orlc t o employees in a particula r labor organization or in 
a particular trade, craft, or clas s r ather than to employees 
in another labor organization or in another t rade, craft, 
or class, unless such employer i s f ailin g to conform to an 
order or certifi cation of t h e Board determinin g t he ba r gain-
ing representative for employees perf orming such work: 
Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection (b) shal l 
be construed to ma ke unTa'\'rful a refusal by any person to 
enter upon the premises of any empl oyer (other than hi s m-m 
employer ) , if the employees of such employer are en ga ged in 
a strike ratified or approved by a representative of such 
employees \'Them such employer is reQuired to reco-gnize under 
the Act; 
I08 
SECTION 10 
(1 )vlhenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an 
unfair labor -practice within the meaning of :pe.ragr aph ( 4) 
(A), (B}, or lc) of Section 8 (b), the preliminary invest-
i gation _ of such · charg~ ·· shall be made f orth\tli th and given 
priority over all other caseE? except cases of like charac -
ter in. the office where it is filed or to \tlhich it is re-
ferred-. If, after such investigation,; the officer or region-
al attorney to '\'Thorn the matter may be referred has reasona ble 
cause to believe suoh char ge is true and that a complaint 
should issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any 
district court of the United States (including the District 
Court of the United States for the District of Columbia) 
wi thin any district where the unfa .r labor practice in ques-
tion has occurred, is alleged to have occurred, or tttherein 
such person resides or transacts business, for appropriate 
injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of t e 
Board 1-.rith respect to such matter. Upon filing of arry such 
petition the district court shall have jurisdiction to grant 
such injunctive relief or temporary restraining order as it 
deems just and proper, notwithstanding any other provision 
of la'V't: Provided further, The.t no temporary restraining 
order she.ll be is-sued without notice unless a petition al-
leges that substantial and irreparable injury to the charging 
pa rty '\'fill be unav0idable and such temporary restrainin13 
order shall be effective for no longer than five days and 
will become void at the expiration of such period. Upon 
filing any such petition the courts shall cause notice thereof 
to be served upon arry person involved in the charge opportltn-
ity to appear by counsel and present any relevant testimony: 
Provided further, That for the purposes of t his subse¢tion 
district courts shall be deemed to he. ve jurisdiction of a 
labor orgaruhzation (I.) in the district in ''~hich such organ-
ization maintains its principal office, or (.2) in arry district 
in '·thich its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged 
in. promoting or protecting the interests of employee members·. 
The service of legal process upon such officer or a gent shall 
constitute service upon the labor organization and make such 
organization a party to the suit·. In situations where such 
relief is appropriate the procedure specified herein shall 
apply to charges with respect to sectim1 ~, (b) ( 4) (D)'. 
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STATISTICS 
1-3t h ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NAT I01TAL lABOR REIAT IONS BOAPJ) 1948 
Page 100 -Charges Filed Against a Union .Under Section 8b4 of 
the Dabor Management Relations Act, 8/22/47 - 6/30/48 
Total Cases 
Subsection 
II 
II 
II 
8b4 
A 
B· 
c 
D 
No'. of Cases Showing 
Spec. ~ llegations 
311 
224 
74 
20 
71 
% of Total 
100. 
72. 
23-.8 
6.4 
22.8 
I ndustrial Distribution of Unfair Labor Practice Cases 
Industrial Group All Cases Unfair Labor Practice Cases 
Total 
Manufacturing 
Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing 
Mining 
Construction 
\fuolesa le Trade 
Retail T.rade 
Finance, Insurance 
and Real Estate 
Transportation, Com-
munication and other 
Public Utilit i es 
Services 
CA 
10636 2553 
6996 1725 
14 4 
213 28 
341 50 
657 138 
635 111 
174 79 
1113 287 
473 131 
CB' 
438 
209 
0 
16 
47 
11 
59 
4 
65 
27 
cc 
243 
87 
1 
10 
45 
19 
21 
0 
40 
20 
CD 
68 
14 
0 
0 
28 
l 
3 
0 
8 
14 
1"10. 
14th ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL lABOR RElATIONS BOARD 1949 
Page 160 - Cha rges Filed Against a Union Under Section 8b4 of 
the Labor Management Relations Act ended JLtne 30, 1949 
Total Cases 
Subsection 
II 
II 
II 
8b4 
A 
B; 
c 
D 
N-o. of Cases Showing 
Spec. Allegations 
340 
247 
89 
30 
77 
% of Total 
100". 
72.6 
28.2 
8.8 
22". '6 
Industrial Distribution of Unfair Labor Practice Cases 
Industrial Group All Cases Unfair Labor Practice Cases 
Total . 
Manufacturing 
Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing 
Mining 
Construction 
\llholesale Trade 
Retail Trade 
Finance, Insurance 
and Real Estate 
Transportation, Com-
munication and other 
Public Utilities 
Services 
25874 
15482 
2 
228 
860 
2397 
2607 
437 
2915 
946 
CA CB 
4154 820 
2441 312 
1 1 
49 17 
202 1411· 
258 48 
345 74 
245 4 
432 140 
181 80 
cc 
268 
89 
0 
9 
72 
26 
22 
4 
37 
9 
CD 
72 
25 
0 
0 
36 
1 
0 
0 
9 
1 
15th ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL lABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1950 
Page 220 - Charges Filed Against a Union Under Section 8b4 of 
the Labor Manag~ment Relations Act ended June : 30, 1950 
Total Cases 
SUbsection 
tl 
tl 
II 
8b4 
A 
R 
c 
D 
No. of Cases Showing 
Spec. Allegations 
340 
161 
14 
21 
66 
% of Total 
100. 
47 •. 2 
4.1 
6'.2 
19'•·3 
Industrial Distribution of Unfair Labor Practice Cases 
Industrial Group All Cases Unfair Labor Practice Cases 
Total 
Manufacturing 
Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing 
:D-1ining 
Construction 
Wholesale Trade 
Retail Trade 
Finance, Insurance 
and Real Estate 
Transportation, Com-
munication and other 
Public Utilities 
Services 
21632 
13498 
8 
245 
774 
1886 
2170 
105 
2217 
729 
CA CB 
(A, B, and C 
have been 
grouped under 
one heading, 
cc, 1950-1956) 
cc 
275 
96 
1 
4 
48 
26 
26 
0 
59 
15 
CD 
66 
12 
1 
0 
37 
3 
1 
0 
9 
4 
112. 
16th ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIOJ\TAL lABOR RElATIONS BOARD 1951 
Page 294 - Charges Filed Against a Union Under Section 8b4 of 
the Labor Management Relations Act ended ~Une 30, 1951 
Total Cases 
Subsection 
II 
II 
II 
8b4 
A 
B1 
c 
D 
No. of Cases Showing 
Spec. Allegations 
239 
Jl43 
60 
22 
72 
% of Total 
Industrial Distribution of Unfair Labor Practice Cases 
Industrial Group All Cases Unfair I.abor Practice Cases 
cc CD 
Total 22298 167 72 
l•lanufac turing 14708 71 10 
Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing 0 0 0 
Mining 302 10 1 
Construction 703 26 42 
Wholesale Trade 1597 17 0 
Retail Trade 1999 9 I . 
Finance, Insurance 
and Real Estate 156 0 1 
Transportation, Corn-
munication and other 
Public Utilities 2158 32 16 
Services 675 2 1 
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17th ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ~TIO~L lABOR RElATIONS BOARD 1952 
Page 281 - Charges Filed Against a Union Under Section 8b4 of 
the ~abor Management Relations Act ended J-une 30, 1952 
Total Cases 
Subsect i on 
II 
II 
II 
8b4 
A 
B : 
c 
D 
No. of Cases Showing 
Spec·.· Allegations 
302 
189 
64 
26 
89 
% of Total 
100'.-·! 
62.6 
21", 2 
8,·6 
29.-5 
Industria l Distribution of Unfair Labor ~actice Cases 
I ndustrial Group All Cases Unfair Labor Practice Cases 
cc CD 
Total 15901 213 89 
Manufacturing 10039 76 25 
Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing 15 0 0 
Mining 270 8 0 
Construction 728 36 41 
Wholesale Trade 1182 14 3 
Retail Trade 1570 37 3 
Finance, Insurance 
and Real Estate 94 1 0 
Tran sportation , Com-
munication and other 
Public Util i ties 1460 37 17 
Services 543 5 0 
1-3:.4 
18th ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL lABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1953 
Page 95 - Charges Filed Against a Uhion Uhder Section 8b4 of 
the Labor Management Relations Act ended June 30, 1953 
Total Cases 
Subsection 
11 
II 
II 
8b4 
A 
B' 
c 
D 
No. of Cases Shmving 
Spec. Allegations 
250 
160 
47 
15 
17 
% of Totar 
100 
64 
18.8 
6.0 
28.4 
Industrial Distribution of Unfair Labor Practice Cases 
Industrial Group All Cases Unfair :Cabor Practice Cases 
cc CD 
Total 14712 179 71 
!vianufac turing 9353 63 20 
Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing 11 0 0 
Hining 238 2 0 
Construction 627 46 36 
\t'lholesale Trade 1119 27 3 
Retail Trade 1456 13 0 
Fi nance, Insurance 
and Real Estate 66 0 0 
Transportation, Com- · 
munication and other 
Public Utilities 1388 25 11 
Services lt-54 3 1 
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19th ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL lABOR RElATIONS BOA.RD 1954 
Page 157 - Cha r ges Filed Against a Union Under Section 8b4 of 
the Labor Management Relations Act ended June 30, 1954 
Total Cases 
Subsect i on 
.. . 
II 
II 
8b4 
A 
B 
a 
D 
No. of Ca ses Showing 
Spec ·. Allegations 
335 
234 
70 
21 
85 
% of Total 
10o-_. 
69.9 
20-.9 
6.3 
25 .• 4 
Industrial Distribution of Unfair Labor Practice Cases 
Industrial Group All Cases Unfair Labor Practice Cases 
cc CD 
Total 14041 250 85 
Manufacturing 8523 75 23 
Agriculture , Forestry 
and Fishing 22 1 0 
Mining 189 4 1 
a onstruction 905 74 38 
Wholesale Trade 1031 18 ~ 
Retail Trade 1336 17 2 
Finance, Insurance 
and Real Estate 88 2 0 
Transportation, Com-
munication and other 
Public Utilities 1552 56 17 
Ser-vices 395 3 1 
1:16, 
20th ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1955 
Table 5 - Charges Filed Against a Union Under Section 8b4 of 
the Labor Management Relations Act ended June 30, 1955 
Total Cases 
Subsection 
II 
II 
II 
8b4 
A 
B 
c 
D 
No. of Cases Showing 
Spec. Allegati.ons 
427 
303 
124 
39 
82 
% of Total 
100. 
71. 
29. 
9.1 
19'.2 
Industrial Distribution of Unfair Labor Practice Cases 
Industrial Group 
Total 
Hanufacturing 
Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing 
Mining 
Construction 
vfuolesale Trade 
Retail Trade 
Finance , Insurance 
and Real Esta te 
Transportation, Com-
mtmication and other 
fublic Utilities 
Services 
All Cases 
13336 
8287 
9 
184 
1082 
922 
872 
46 
1645 
289 
Unfair Labor Practice Cases 
cc 
345 
111 
2 
3 
116 
28 
22 
0 
56 
7 
CD 
82 
17 
0 
0 
44 
1 
4 
0 
16 
0 
APPENDIX C 
UNITED STATES JOINT COM!v1ITTEE HEARINGS - LABOR MANAGEMENT-
RELATIONS - 1948 
Volume 1, Senator Joseph H~ Ball, Chairman. 
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Pages 380, 381, 391. Statement of Woodruff Randolph, Pres-
ident, International Typographical Union, AFL. 
11 Strike Breaking Against OUrselves. 11 
MR. R.P.NDOLPH -~ i . ;.the second fundament-al principle in the 
operation of a trade union is the preservation of the right 
not to work on competing struck goods or substandard materials. 
Like most industries, the printin>?;_, trades operate partly as 
union shops and partly as nonunion:.! By and large, the non-
union shops pay lo\'rer wages and work longer hours than the 
union shops. As the Congress must be aware, there is a 
constant pressure in every industry exerted by nonunion 
shops to undercut the standards which the trade union has 
built up. ''le \'Tant fair competition in the industry, by '\•Thich 
we mean that employers shall compete on the basis of their 
efficiency and good judgment and not on the basis of seeing 
1-1ho can pay the lowest wages·. The nonunion substandard 
shops are a threat to our employers: our employers, quite as 
much as we, have an interest in seeing to it that they are 
not driven out of business b~ some competitor paying far 
belo1-1 the union-negotiated standards. To meet this problem 
1-re a r e required to do two things; first, to organize employees 
of such competitors in order that '\vages, . hours and working 
conditions in the industry shall be stable and competition be 
fair, and, second, not to allgw competing substandard products 
to enter into a union product·_r.;·. ,-.THE CHAIRMAN You operate on 
the theory that union should have the authority to determine 
what is fair competition, what are fair and standard condit-
ions in an industry, and use the restrictive power of the 
secondary boycott, which is what we are talking about, to 
enforce its decision of what is fair and standard. N'ow is 
we allow that privilege to a union I do not knovr whY' you 
should not allow it to an association of employers to use 
the secondary boycott. If an employer used it it is clearly 
a violation of the antitrust law. If a fe11 big employers 
could violate the antitrust laws pretty soon they would be 
running the whole industry·. What you are saying is the union 
should have a different set of rules when it decides vthat is 
fair and standard in that industry·. It should be able to use 
any kind of a weapon, economic weapon, to enforce its decis-
ions even though they differ from the decisions of the employees 
directly affected·. 
MR. RANDOLPH That is utterly untrue. It is not my pro-
vince to go into the antitrust law, and alr of those other 
l aws . We have b een i n exis t enc e under the a,nti t r u s t l mm , 
and v.re have been in existence and have happily funct ioned 
as a f ree un i on1 \vi t h free employers up until the t ime 
t he Ta ft-Hartley l a \v wa s pas sed. THE CF..A I ID'T..AW That has 
n ot hing to do \vi th t h e point I raise-. '\'That i s t he d i f-
f erence bet ween a uni on dictatin g and enfor cing its dic-
tates by economic force of s ec ondar y boyc ot ts and an a s-
s ociation of employer s doing t h e same thin5 ? It i s mere-
ly a restraint of commerce. Do n ot t h ese t end to elimin-
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a t e completely f ree ch oi ce of employees and free competition? 
MR. RANDOLPH No. You a re bewitched by a l i ne of thought 
that has pursued you since you began making this Ta ft-Hartley 
law. Your mental processes are _channeled along the ideas 
of ltilling off unions, Mr. Ball'• THE CHAIRMAN You can mal{e 
speeches against me, but why do you not get to the point? 
Where i s it any different? Get dm•m to cases. MR. RANDOLPH 
The differ ence is we are prevented now to exercis e t h e free 
right of contract that \'l e have exercised for our vihole lives 
with an employer who wants the free right of contract to 
a gree vlith us that he is going to employ our people in his 
plant to do a job of printing. We are prevented from using 
t h e free rigl1.t of con tract 1v-e have always had, !vir. Ball, 
and for which we should continue to have the right to contract. 
We are not insisting upon anybody using our people if 
they do n ot vmnt to use them. ~Te are not insisting upon 
anybody joining our union if they do not want to join. 
THE CHAIRMAN You still have not come anywhere near the point. 
Th ere i s not complete free rightof contract for anybody. You 
are free within the limits set by the law·. MR. RANDOLPH That 
is what we are complaining about, Senator Ball. The law has 
destroy ed a right t hat we have always enjoyed and destroyed 
f or no good reason·. -•• ·. :rt is suggested that the Taft-Hartley 
law be amended at the earliest possible date-. 
Statement of o. A. Kni ght, President of Oil \·lorkers I nternational 
Union, CIO. Volume 2, page 771-• 
• -. ·. ·One of the most disturbing features of the act is 
''lith respect to Section 8b4A and section 303, pertaining to 
boycotts and secondary strikes. Under the entire act, it is 
perfectly clear that one company may assist another company 
while its employees are on strike by supplying materials and 
services to its customers, but tha t if employees of one em-
ploye~ lend assistance to the striking employees of anothe~ 
employer t hat such conduct is an unfair labor practice on t he 
part of t he union and t he employees for which they may be sued 
for dama ges. This is not equity under the law·~ -
Certainly t here are some boycotts and secondary strikes 
wh ich are distasteful and wrong , but all such activities 
should not be prohibited merely to prevent the wrong t ype of 
boycott or strike. It is not f air to prohibit one group of 
employees in instances where their employer is lending 
active assistance to break the strike of the -employees of 
another company·. 
Under the la'TtT as it nmv stands, the employees of a 
single employer are required to fight the entire monopoly 
industry. Their rig..llts and privileges are not balanced.-
Again, it appears that management is given distinct pri -
vileges under the act·. 
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Part I, pages 33-34, 166-167,. 180, 184, 269, 460. Testimony 
of Thomas E. Shroyer, of the Law .Firm of Poole, Shroyer and 
Denbo, lvashington , D.C. 
I admit I am in favor of the Taft-Hartley Act. ·. ·. ·. -I i'ras 
regional attorney for the NLRB for 6 years·. · •• ';Briefly stated, 
it was the purpose of these provisions to provide relief for 
that innocent secondary employer caught in a dispute betvJ'een 
a primary employer and the primary employer's union. Congress 
wished to protect t hat secondary employer who had no quarrel 
'ivi th his employees but was made a victim of someone else t:s 
quarrel . He might be a supplier of raw materials to the . 
primary employer and the union 'i-Tished to cut off the latter( s 
supplies in order to make the strike effective against the 
primary employer by cutting off his sales. 
In 1947 this committee heard considerable testimony 
about the so-called monopoly boycott conducted by local no. 3 
of the IBEW in Ne1-r York City. ·ocal 3 1 s electrician members 
refused to install electrical products made by another local 
of IBETt·r. They ,.,.ant ed a complet e monopoly of the electrical 
manufacturing and installation i'Tork in NY"C ·. 
There 'i'Tas also much testimony of the organizational 
boycott being conducted particularly by locals of the teamsters' 
union. Instead of attempt i ng to persuade the employees of 
employer A to join it , the union applied pressure on employer 
A for recognition by boycotting his customers and suppliers. 
There was a recent case that illustrate pretty well the 
secondary boyc ott situation, and just where \tfe are today on it. 
I refer to the Danish Maid Bakery case, out on the Pacific 
Coa st in northern Galifornia. There they had an election and 
the employer voted 52 to 15 ar~ainst union representation. Then 
the union came in and said: 11 \'fell, irrespective of that vote, 
vle 1vant to bargain for thes e employees, 11 and the emplli>yer said 
11 I C€mnot do it, the majority have voted a gainst you·. 11 · 
So, then, -the 1..mion did 3 t b.ing s. Of cours e, t he bakery 
to exist has to put its products in markets 8.nd groc ery stores. 
The firs t t hing that the tmion did vvas call u:p the o ·rners of 
the marlcets and ~rocery stores, of all the customers of Dan ish 
M icJ, and say : Look, take thi s rroduct off' ~r ur she ves. " 
I n some cases that had its effect, and it is not f orbidden by 
present la\11 because present lavt only operates where the pres-
sure is put on the employees of the secondary employer·.; 
The second thin the union did 'iiaS to follow t h e true {s·. 
I n other vrords, ever'-J time the Danish Iviaid Bakery truc k would 
come to the grocery store, they; would put a picket line around 
t h e truck right at the store ' s entrance·. vlell, the Board has 
decided that under the pre sent law it is not a secondary b oy -
cott when you are merely follm~ring the product. They so 
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held in the Schultz Refrigerated case. 
The third thing the.t the union did in that ce.s e \vas 
to nut nickets at the customers 11 entrance a t stores~ That 
'\'las ~ very effective, too, because no retailer and no grocery 
store can have a picket line out in front very long. The 
cus tomers thin...'\.c that he is having a labor dispute. Rea lly, 
the l e.bor dispute is someplace else. The l av-1 , however, does 
not make t h is nractice unlai'lful • 
• ~. -If I - am any judg e of the feellng of the committee 
back in 1947, they felt t hat a secondary boycott '\vas com-
l etely indefensible and should be s topped at once. They 
really '\V"an.ted t o throw the book at them. They \mnt ed to 
stop them. Therefore, all of the extra ordinary remedi e s of 
a sv.i t for damages as \vell a s priority in injunctions w·ere 
prov ded. 
Statemen t of Pm<Tell C. Groner in Behal f of the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United St s.tes, page 167. 
·. ·. ·. A number of improvements are needed in t he sec·oru:le.ry 
boycott provisions, particularly a s concerns t he boycotting 
of s econda ry employers. The definition of 11 concerted activ:tties" 
needs clarification·. 
Serious gaps exist in the secondary boycott provisions 
and improvements are necessary in order to adequately preven t 
the evil practices '\<Thich Congress intended to outla\'1. 
Section 8b4 makes it an unfair l a bor practice for a 
union to indu ce the employees of another employer to refuse 
to handle goods or to perform services. It says nothing about 
inducing the other employer h i mself to boycott the products 
or s ervic es of a struc l\: employer. As a resu lt, labor unions 
have been able to v-rield tremendous boycott pm.Yer upon second-
ary employers, ltthile observing the letter of the la\v pro-
hibiting pressure upon secondary employers. The effect is to 
a pply s evere economic penalties to persons wh o have no d irect 
relationship to the labor di spute. This oversight should be 
c orrected· •. 
Also, t h e Board has deClared to be legal various 
admit tedly concerted employee boycotts against secondar'J 
employers if they are carried out in or nea r the site of the 
primar'J dispute; and tha t exception has been later enlarg e d 
so a s to permit boycotts removed from the site of the dispute 
on the ground that the struck employer's facilities (trucks ) 
could be followed, and the employees of various employers 
unrelated to the disput e could be induced to boycott such 
facilities (Oil \"l'orl{ers International Union, Schultz Refrig-
erated Services, Inc., Com·tay 1 s Express) ·~ · •• ·• 
Some unions have complained that the existing secondary 
boycot t provisions requi r e members on one union to act in 
certai n circumstances as strikebreakers a gainst members of the 
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same union. This allegedly occurs when the struc k employer 
farms out struck work to another employer. If there is any 
equity in the position of the union on the facts as above 
stated, any remedial legislation should be carefully dra\m 
to :permit no weakening of the act 1 1s basic anti - boycott 
provisions. These provisions are aimed at vicious practices, 
extending far beyond the scope of legislation against union 
activities, and should be · strenP:then ed, not \'leakened-. 
Statement of Richard P. Doherty, Vice President, National 
Association of Radio and TV Broadcasters, pages 180, 184 • 
• -~ -. ' I indorse completely section 5 ('b). · •• Paragraph 4 
rrhich .relat es to secondary boycotts, in my opinion, requires 
serious attention because it norl appears to be a major target 
for those \•Tho \'rould undermine the basic rules of laoor relat -
ions·. ·. -•• 
It must be admitted that the s econdary boycott can be 
a po1,.1rerful instrument of unions·. However, left uncontrolled, 
secondary boycott tactics could disrupt vrhole industries, 
trespass roughshod upon the freedom of private enterprise, 
and impose high tariffs upon consumers·. -. ·. -. 
Legislative ground rules to cope vrith the evils of 
secondary boycotts must adequately cover the implementing 
tactics used by unions. These may be classified- into five 
major categories: 
1·." Concerted refusal (including strike) by employees 
to use, process, transport, or othe~tise handle or work on 
any goods, articles, materials, - or commodities or to perform 
services: The U JIRA. clearly recognizes such actions when 
directed against a third party with the objective of putting 
pressure on another employer. 
2. Picketing of third party: OUtright picketing of a 
third party will generally be recognized as an act to induce 
the employees of said. third party to engage in a refusal to 
work. However; seconda~J boycott picketing often takes re.ther 
subtle forms even though the basic intent is to harass the 
neutral, third-party employers·. For example, in the Sterling 
Beverages case and other cases, the Board reasoned that picket-
ing only at the time !Of delivery by trucks (operated by an 
employer in dispute) '\'Tould not be in violation of the LMR.tl, 
section 8b4e,.•'•'ti' 
If one applied the moving situs principle of the Schultz 
and other cases to American business we \'Tould truly extend the 
abuses of third-party picketing·. Would one permit ambulatory 
pickets to follow a TV, typewriter, oil burner, or other 
serviceman and picket each office building, store or home during 
the period of time that t he serviceman1 1s truck was loca ted out-
side? 
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3·. Unfair lists: There is indeed a delica te line 
between union unfair lists as primary boycott instruments and 
unfair lists designed to damage a 3rd party business frim a s 
a means of bringing economic pressure upon the employer in 
d i spute. 
For example: A radio or TV station becomes enga ged 
in a dispute with one of its unions. Sponsors are informed 
of the strike and told by the union that the station is un-
fair. However, the next steps involves putting all s ponsors 
who cont i nue advertising over the station (in accord Vvi th a 
contract) on an unfair list. The obvious point is t hat the 
union regards continuing sponsorship of proe;rams and ad-
vertising over the struck station, as indicating support 
for the so-called unfair s tation. Yet, the real pur pose 
behind designating sponsors on an unfair list is to nduce 
and cause loss of bu siness by these sponsors. The exact 
pressure is to force sai d sponsors to cease doing business 
vrith the radio station under penalty of having t h.eir m•m 
business picketed. The effect of a sponsor unfair list is 
the same as established pickets at the retail outlets of 
the sDonsor. 
- 4·. Threats against management: Threats against em-
ployees of a third party employer desi g:n.ed to cause the 
employer to cease doing business with another employer are 
\>Tell covered by the L:MRA". · 
However, there is no proscription of threats a gainst 
the third party employer himself or his management agents·. 
5. Agreements between union and an employer: (canned 
vs. live music) •••• 
Proposal: To meet s~arely the real problems of second~ 
ary boycotts and to prevent secondary boycotts from being · 
used to undermine our economic system and breed industrial 
strife, I propose the follovting language for section 8b4 amended. ·.~ 
(4)To induce, or coerce, or to attempt to induce or 
coerce, either directly or indirectly by means of threat of 
reprisals, the use of 1 unfair 1 lists, or otherwise, any 
employer or other person, to refuse to buy, sell, use, manufac-
ture , process, transport, or otherwise cause work to be done 
on any goods, articles, materials or commodities, or to cause 
any servi'ces to be performed, or to engage in, a strike or a 
concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, 
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work 
on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to per-
form any services, where an object thereof is: 
('a )Causing any employer to cease or refrain from doing 
business with any other employer or person or canceling exist-
ing contracts or terminating existing trade relations with any 
other employer or person; (b)Forcing or requiring any other 
employer ~:0 recognize or bargain with a labor organization as 
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the representative of his employees; (c)Interferin.g with the 
collective-bargaining processes engaged in bet,'ieen any other 
employer and the labor organization representing his em-
ployees· • .-_.. ·. 
Statement of George vl. Armstrong, Jr·., Chairman of the Indus-
trial Relations Committee, National Association of Manufac-
turers·~ pag·e 269·: 
I;abor unions oppose the limited prohibition of the sec-
ondary boycott on the ground that the prohibition makes it 
difficult for them to extend their organizational activities. 
The secondary boycott is one mechanism by vlhich a dis-
pute in one plant is utilized to cause an interruption of 
work in another plant in which no disagreement exists be-
tvleen the employer and his employees. 
The right to self-organization is protected by the la'" 
for t he employees v1ho wish to organize and bargain collec-
tively. 
National labor policy is not and should not be designed 
to enable labor organizers to organize all employees without 
regard to their own vlishes. National labor policy should be 
designed to make it easier for the employees to effectuate 
this desire to bargain collectively or to refrain from bar-
gaining collectively. The protection should be extended to 
the employee rather than to the employer on the one hand or 
the labor union of the other. 
If national labor policy is designed to enable employ-
ees to express their own · choice vTi th respect to self-organ-
ization and collective bargaining , there can be no justifi-
cation v-lhatever for the secondary boycott. The secondary 
boycott is a vicious exercise of power. It stops production, 
puts employees out of vlOrk 'VIi thout regard to their m·m free 
choice, results in violation of collective bargaining a gree-
ments , penalizes employees by loss of wages, and i nvolves 
extens ive costs for t he employer , sometimes to the extent 
of destroying his business. It deprives the public of the 
products or services of the business involved, even thou~p 
there is no dispute bet\veen. the employer and his employees·: . 
• • • Rather than VTealten the secondary boycott provision, 
it should be strengthened . In accordance with current inter-
pretation, the secondary boycott is permitted if it is 
carried on at the site of a primary strike, even though the 
b oycott lnterferende affects the employer-employee relation 
of another employer at the same site. In addition, under the 
present lavl, t h e Board holds that unions may enlist t h e 
support of a gricultural and transport workers in dispute 
a ctivities because su ch employees may not be covered by t:1.e 
LMHA and are, therefore, bey ond the reach of the secondary 
boycott nrovisions. 
These and other loopholes in the secondary boycott 
Drovisions ought to be closed in order that the exercise 
of t hi s vicious practice ma y be effectively discouraged. 
\ITe recom.rnend that the mandatory in,junction i n cases 
of s econdary boycotts be retain ed and that it b e strenf3t h -
ened to malce i t full:V effective·. 
Statement of Arthur J ·~ Goldberg , General Counsel, CIO, pa ge 46o· • 
•• -.unions, of course, do not ordi narily interest t h em-
selves in an employer's business dealine;s vlith other per.:.ons 
except vrhen t h ose deal ings have a n effect on the \va ges, hours, 
\•larking conditions and the strength and s t ability of t h e 
union ' s capac ity to engage in collective bar gaining for its 
members·. In such c i rcumstances they are legi tiina tely c on-
c erned to protect their l ivins standards and the uni on a sainst 
empl oyer tact ics t hat are certainly no better, and in many 
cases are much ''~O •se, throm the abuses characteris ing the 
activities of a fel'r unions in some localities, rith vrhich 
s ection 8b4 was presumably designed to deal. 
Yet under section 8b4 it does not make a.ny difference 
if t he reason employees of one employer r efuse to handle ~>vork 
contracted to him by another' employer because the latter ' s 
employees are on strike, is t hat they do not want to work on 
struck wor k or on vwrk from runm'i'ay shops or on goods pro-
duced under substandar d or sv;eatsh op conditions. The lLTlion 
r epresentin g the employees on strike can enlist t hej.r assist-
ance only a t t he risk of running afoul of section 8b4 since 
one of the effects of such ass i stance may be construed to 
be "forcing or requiring11 their employer to break off his 
business dealings with the employer of the striking c ompany . · ••• 
Is a refusal by employees to work on goods coming from another 
empl oyer because that employer has sought to avoid union v-ra e;e 
scales and working condi tions by moving to a new locat ion, or 
becaus e he maintains a m-reatshop and pays substanda.rd vmges 
any less legitima te t han their refusal to h~ndle struc k fork? 
No fair minded person could argue that t h is is t he ca se ·. -~ , •• 
The provi sions of section 8b4 should eith er be elim-
inatec from t h e act or drastically amended to remove t heir 
antiunion effects. 
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S:!roTION;S 8 (b)( 4 )A: AND 10 (1) OF 
THE LABOR ~~NAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947 
The last six to seven decades have been marked by 
inconsistent attitudes on the part of the Federal Govern-
ment in the field of labor·~ Beginning with the applicat-
ion of the Sherman Anti-trust Act against organized labor, 
federal attitude has vacillated· •. 
Concerted sec ondary activities on the part of unions 
ioJ'hich interfered with interstate commerce were held to be 
illegal under the Sherman Act. The Clayton Act was passed 
to exempt labor unions from the Anti-trust laws, but the 
Courts ruled, much to the chagrin of Samuel Gompers, that 
those '·tho take part, in a labor dispute mus t be directly 
concerned. Thus one local could not appeal to another 
l ocated elsewhere to aid them in a dispute·. 
There was no additional federal labor legislation 
until the Norris - LaGuardia Act in 1932. By this time, 
Congress had gone through a complete change in attitude 
toward le,bor, no doubt accentuated by the Depression. As 
a result , the Norris - LaGUardia Act was passed, outlawing 
the use of the labor injunction except in special instances. 
This act ~as rapidly followed by the National Labor Relations 
Act of 1935. The import of the t~ro acts was the.t "conc erted 
activities" on the part of unions were permissible. Included 
in the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (the 
ltlagner Act) was a list of employer unfair labor practices·. 
For the first time, employers could be held liable for 
certain acts in labor disputes·. The pendulum of power 
had s'\ru.ng to\'Tard. labor'.-. 
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Within a short time, voices were being raised in 
opposition to the Wagner Act·. It was claimed that the Act 
was not equitable for it listed employer unfair labor prac-
tices while not listing employee unfair labor practices·_., 
It was also claimed that labor unions had economic pO'\'I'er 
which \'las so great that it was destructive·~-
After World \r/ar II, anti - union feeling was high 
because of the wave of post war strikes·.· Therefore, the 
new 8oth Congress, passed in 1947, the omnibus Thabor Ma-
nagement Relations Act commonly knm'i'U as the Taft-Hartley 
Act. 
The 1• Taft-Hartley Act was supposed to have amended 
t h e inequities of the Wagner Act·. Included in the provis-
ions of the Act is a list of employee unfair labor practices 
as well as a provision outlawing the secondary boycott. 
There is also a provision providing for the issuance of an 
injunction in case of "prima facie'' violation of the boy-
cott section. 
Congress, in passing the secondary boycott provision, 
wished to protect "neutrals" in industrial disputes, but in 
doing so weakened labor1's power·~ 
In the simple type of secondary boycott case, in 
which theEe was no question as to the existence of the 
boycott, both the National Labor Relations Board and the 
Courts applied the proscription of Section 8 (b)( 4 )A, thus 
protect ing the secondary employer, the so-called 11 neutral. 11 
But the National Labor Relations Board and the Court s 
recognized that a union ' 's lawful primary rights must be 
preserved. These rights, in connection with Section 8 (b) 
(4)A, are the rights to strike and picket the primary 
employer for legitimate ends as defined by Taft-Hartl ey. 
It was ruled in such cases as Pure Oil and others that 
prima ry action with secondary effects is permissible·. By 
secondary effects, the National Labor Relations Board re-
ferred to cases in which a uni on would be c onducting a 
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lawful strike against a primary employer, but would a.,f fect 
secondary employers just as if they were being struck aga i nst. 
Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States 
exempted from the proscripti ons of Section 8 (b)('4)A 11hot 
cargo11 clauses·. The decision allows labor unions to have 
clauses written into their collective bargaining agreements 
to the effect that the employees of the employer could re-
fuse to "\'tork on another employer 1's struck goods. Therefore, 
any union which has such an agreement can refuse to handle 
the primary employer 1 's strucl-c goods·. , The implication is that 
general ubiquity of such clauses will completely negate 
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Section 8 (b)( 4 ) A. 
But it is evid.ent that prot ection of the "neutra l 11 
in industrial disputes h a s weak ened l abor. To what extent 
is not cert a in , for "hot ca.r go" clauses might very 'I.-Jell 
provide a loophole for l nbor. 
The l abor injunction , the use of which wr:.s effectively 
curtailed by the Norri s-La Guard.ia Act, was reinst e.t ed by 
Section 10 (1) of the Taft-Hartley Act. The General Counsel 
of the National Labor Rel2t ions Board c c:n p etition a Feo.ere.l 
Dist r ict Court for an injunction for suspected violation of 
Section 8 (b ) ( 4 ). If ther•e i s 11prima fr~.c i e 11 evidence to 
the effect tha t a secondary boycott exists , the cour t 
will is s ue an injunction to remain in effect until the 
r~ational Labor Relat i o n s Board rules on the c e.se. The 
success of a union v aries i nversel: with th e l engt h of t he 
injunction . This st a t ement holds true f or sev er•a l r easons. 
First, injunction s are in effe ct on the a verage seven 
months . There have een some tha t h ave been in effect l ess 
tha n t wo months a nd some that have been in effect for more 
t han t v,Jo yes,rs . I n many c ases , unions have given up before 
the Bo 2rd decision. The building unions, more than others , 
are most affected by injunctions of extended duration .. and it 
is in the building industry tha t one fin ds the most with-
drawe..ls . Threat of a lengthy injunction seems to be the best 
r ea son for the grea t i ncidence of vJ ithdrav-Jals in the building 
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industry. 
Secondly, the mandatory injunction restores the 11 status 
auo 11 which is the situation that existed before the labor 
- ' 
dispute began. But the injunction, by restoring the original 
situation, prevents the union from taking any action whatso-
ever. If the dispute was over some immediate problem, then 
the union is defeated no matter what the later decision of 
the Board might be. If the dispute occurs in the construction 
industry, a lengthy injunction might allow the project to 
be finished without the dispute having been decided upon 
by the Board·• Thus, in such cases, the belated decisions 
of the Board are of no concern to the union involved. We 
see then, that restoration of the ''status quo 11 works a gainst 
the union. 
Thirdly, the General Counsel is affiliated ·v1ith the 
National Labor Relations Board·. · When an employer petitions 
the General Counsel to go before a Federal District Court, 
he is attempting to enlist the aid of a person that has "'the 
massive prestige of the United b~ates Government behind 
him·.u ·· Also, conclusive proof is not needed for issuance of 
an injunction. Therefore, the injunction procedure has been 
severely criticized by labor and pro-labor sympathizers· •. 
In summation, it can be said t hat Sections 8 (b)(4)A 
and 10 (1) of the Taft - Hartley Act have been instrumental 
in reversing the trend of increased labor power. Modificat-
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ions of both sections have been su gg esteci by President 
Truma n a nd Presiclent Eisenhow er. If past events a re a ny 
key to the f ut ure, then t here will be a reveraal of govern-
men t a l a ttitude once more~ 
